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ABSTRACT   
 
This project analyzes the relationship between land privatization and 
violence in societies that previously employed non-capitalist land tenure systems. 
Exploring the cases of the Dakota in Minnesota, the Acholi in Northern Uganda, 
and indigenous communities in southern Mexico, I examine how the state forcibly 
incorporated collective land systems into capitalism through a combination of 
physical, structural, and intra-community violences. This results in the 
disintegration of previous means of agricultural production and the accompanying 
community-based cultural systems. Communities resist this process, however, as 
they battle for natural resource sovereignty and sustainable peace in their 
homelands.  
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If Acholi people didn’t have land, there would be a very big problem.  
Investors would be chasing them all the time. Now that I have kids,  
how am I going to feed them?  
How am I going to send them to school? 
 
If Acholi people had no land, they would be sleeping in verandas,  
on the balconies of some rich people. 
 
-Grace, interview participant from Gulu, Northern Uganda 
 
 
 
 
 
 They want to displace us as if we have no children.  
 
We need development;  
this is democracy.  
 
-An executive officer of the Gulu Concerned Landowners Association, Northern 
Uganda  
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FOREWORD  
 
 I came to study the relationship between land rights, capitalism, and 
violence in Northern Uganda, where I lived with a family for two months in an 
area that was virtually uninhabitable three years prior because of war. In 
collaboration with my friend Obunya Dean, I undertook a one-month fieldwork 
research project to better understand the relationship between land conflict and 
the 23-year civil war. When I asked Acholi people about the result of land 
alienation, they responded almost exactly the same as when I asked about the 
effects of war: violence experienced both by land privatization and from the war 
resulted in widespread physical displacement, internment, malnutrition, 
starvation, physical battle, and death. Further, violence from land alienation and 
from war result in massive changes to cultural, political, spiritual, and economic 
systems; this community breakdown—which results in death in some cases—is a 
form of structural violence (violence built into systems that results in unequal life 
chances) as Acholis are denied land, their most basic need. Community survival 
systems continue to breakdown in the aftermath of war, as the government 
continues to build pressure to legally title property—and therefore allow formerly 
inalienable land to be bought and sold— leading to intra-community violence in 
the form of nearly daily land wrangles (skirmishes between neighbors over land 
delineation).  
 Listening to and learning from my Acholi friends and host family, I came 
to understand the war as far more complex than the terroristic barbarity that not 
only the Ugandan central government, but also many of non-governmental 
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organizations (that sustain themselves on continuing the poverty they pledge to 
combat) portray it to be. The war is about colonialism, geopolitics, power, natural 
resource rights, and many other factors too complex to fully grasp in a mere two 
months. Leaving Uganda very humbled, one thing did seem clear to me: 
sustainable peace cannot come to the Acholi people until safe access to communal 
land is assured.  
 I began to think more deeply about the relationship between land 
privatization and violence. What forms of violence are manifested in the shift 
from a collective to a privatized land system? Can land privatization—often the 
basis for implementing capitalism—be considered a form of violence? I wanted to 
investigate these questions and push myself to better understand the complexities 
between violences and capitalism across time, geography, and community. The 
case of the neoliberalization of Mexico, predicated on legally changing the land 
system from the collective ejido to now-alienable land, first drew me to Latin 
American Studies. As a current Minnesota resident, I thought it imperative to 
learn more about the genocide and land expropriation policies that enable my 
residency in this state.  
 As a white woman and a U.S. citizen, I harbor a sense of ambivalence 
about my position within this project. I am acutely aware that the ability to study 
the Other comes with an extremely fraught colonial history of privilege based on 
exploitation; as Jane Blocker (2009) argues, the witness is a privileged subject 
position. In particular, researching populations that have been labeled as 
“indigenous” is predicated on painful histories of degradation on the part of white 
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academics (and the political and economic forces they frequently support). Those 
are not historical grievances, but the continuing problems of the neocolonial 
academy in which I am participating through this project.  
 I do not claim to speak for or represent the communities I discuss and 
though I act as a conduit between my case studies and the reader, I undoubtedly 
shape the transmission of information. I encourage those reading to interrogate 
their own positionality, relationship to the studied communities, and relationship 
to me as a highly privileged person within the neoliberal system.  
 I have tried to fully represent the challenges surrounding issues of land 
privatization and manifestations of violence. I take full responsibility for any 
misrepresentations of people, history, events, or concepts.  
 I welcome any question, concern, critique or comment you may have of 
this project. Please contact me at nicoleskligerman@gmail.com to begin a 
dialogue.  
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
For a colonized people the most essential value, because the most concrete,  
is first and foremost the land:  
the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity. 
 
-Franz Fanon (1965: 44) 
 
 Safe access to land provides the cornerstone for sustainable peace for 
many communities throughout the world.  Land provides not only for the physical 
well being of those who tend it, but the basis for political, economic, social, 
religious, and cultural exchanges as well. What happens when people, who 
previously accessed their land communally, are pushed into privatized land 
systems? How, and by whom, is that privatization enacted and what are its long-
term effects?  
 In this project, I explore the relationship between different forms of 
violence1 enacted on societies that previously employed non-capitalist land tenure 
systems. My theoretical analysis is based on three case studies, all of which 
formerly operated under non-capitalist land tenure systems: the Dakota in the 
Midwestern United States, the Acholi in Northern Uganda, and different 
indigenous communities in southern Mexico. Specifically, I examine the process 
through which non-capitalist land tenure systems are forcibly incorporated into 
capitalist production systems through a combination of physical, structural, and 
intra-community violences. Though separate phases, these forms of violence exist 
on an interconnected spectrum that mutually reinforces their differing 
                                                 
1 There is a contentious theoretical debate surrounding the definition of violence. In this project, 
I use Johan Galtung's (1969) definition as “violence is present when human beings are being 
influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential 
realizations” (168). 
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manifestations. As Robben and Nordstrom argue (1995), “too-narrow 
conceptualization of violence prevents us from realizing that what is at stake is 
not simply destruction but also reconstruction, not just death but also survival” 
(6).  
 My research findings suggest a causal relationship between the three 
forms of violence: physical war “clears” communal land of its inhabitants via 
death and forced internment, leading to further land alienation and the subsequent 
structural violence born from the inability to safely access land. Structural 
violence leads to intra-community violence as neighbors begin to fight for control 
of the quickly diminishing natural resource. Intra-community violence can then 
result in civil strife or even war. This results in the disintegration of previous 
means of agricultural production and the accompanying community-based 
cultural systems. Communities resist this process, however, as they battle for 
natural resource sovereignty and sustainable peace in their homelands. 
 The Dakota, Acholis, and southern Mexican communities experience the 
three stages of violence on a spectrum, with varying levels of severity and impact 
at each formation. They differ in important ways, yet in all three cases shifting the 
land tenure systems from collective holding to a privatized system necessitated 
state-sponsored physical violence and legal changes that sabotaged the 
populations’ ability to safely access land. Differences between the case study 
societies contrast with the similar outcomes of experiencing violences, 
highlighting important theoretical cohesion despite differences. The fact that 
similar causal processes can be identified despite case differences points to the 
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broader applicability of my hypothesis. In all three cases, capitalism serves a form 
of violence in and of itself.  
 The story between the relationship between capitalism and violence would 
not be complete without highlighting community resistance at every stage of 
violence2. Ignoring these highly political community actions, which occurred in 
all three cases, would be not only misleading, but disempowering as well. As 
such, I additionally chronicle community-based resistance to land privatization.  
 This project took place over several stages. I began by conducting nine in-
depth interviews with residents of the Laroo Division in Gulu District of Northern 
Uganda on the effects of war in terms of land access3. The majority of the 
interviews were conducted in Acholi and translated by Obunya Dean, but some 
were held in either English or a combination of the two languages. To protect my 
interview informants, all of their names have been changed in this paper; my 
informants chose their own pseudonyms. Additionally, we held interviews with 
local experts in field related to my research, including a local politician, an NGO 
worker, a professor at Gulu University, and the executive committee of the Gulu 
Concerned Landowners Association. I researched the Dakota and indigenous 
Mexican case studies primarily through secondary research accomplished by 
                                                 
2  There is considerable scholarly debate surrounding definitions and recordings of resistance, but 
the purpose of my project is not to enter into such analysis. Michael Brown (1996) contends 
that Brown contends that “attributions of resistance become an important rhetorical tool” for 
the social scientist to preach her own sense of morality (729). He further argues that “the 
indiscriminate use of resistance and related concepts undermines their analytical utility” (730) 
and ultimately can serve to “violat[e] the complex and creative understandings of those for 
whom we [anthropologists] presume to speak” (734). Jocelyn A. Hollander and Rachel L. 
Einwohner (2004) convincingly argue that “resistance is a fashionable topic” (533) and outline 
varying uses of the contested term.  
3   Although all of my interview participants lived in the same division in Gulu, there was 
diversity in their responses based largely on generational and educational differences, as well 
as on what kind of land tenure my informants lived and worked.  
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other researchers in addition to primary documents such as copies of land 
privatization bills and transcripts of statements made during war. To support my 
research specific to the case studies, I drew upon the works of several theorists of 
structural violence, capitalism, the role of resource privatization, and resistance in 
other conflicts worldwide. I incorporated that research throughout the theoretical 
analysis of this project.  
 
Overview of Case Studies   
 
 The ordering of my case study material reflects the specific connections 
between the events in these three populations; while the Dakota and Acholi cases 
are more comparable to each other, the experiences of indigenous Mexicans who 
oppose neoliberalism (the contemporary form of capitalism based on global “free” 
trade and state deregulation)4 are less parallel. Despite the differences in process, 
however, the results of violence and land alienation on Mexicans are similar to 
that of the more analogous experiences of the Dakota and Acholi. Below, I briefly 
describe the experiences of the Dakota, Acholi, and indigenous Mexican 
communities in relation to war and land alienation; the subsequent chapters will 
provide significantly more detail and analysis of these events.  
 
The Dakota 
 
 The expansion of Euro-Americans into the present day western United 
States was predicated on the massacres of many nations indigenous to the land 
and federal legislation that further alienated those nations. The Dakota of 
Minisota Makoce (“Land Where the Waters Reflect the Skies” in the Dakota 
                                                 
4
 Please see David Harvey’s (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism for more.  
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language, and termed “Minnesota” by settlers) entered into several land treaties 
with the U.S. government, notably the 1851 Treaty of Traverse de Sioux. In 1862, 
angered at violations of that 1851 treaty, a group of Dakota warriors declared war 
on the state of Minnesota. After the Dakota soldiers lost the war against the 
Minnesotan troops in six short weeks, Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey 
ordered the forced internment of 2,100 Dakota civilians in concentration camps at 
Fort Snelling and Mankato, Minnesota, as well as the mass execution of 307 
Dakota men (ultimately 38 of them were killed). Arguing that “the Sioux [the 
umbrella term for the Lakota, Nakota, and Dakota nations used by non-Native 
Americans] must be exterminated or driven forever beyond the borders of the 
State” (Wilson 2005: 190), Ramsey presided over the Dakota Genocide that 
ultimately took the lives of hundreds of civilians in concentration camps and 
death marches. Bounties of $25 to $200 dollars were placed on the heads of 
remaining Dakota people resulting in their fleeing and an exacerbation of the 
Dakota Diaspora.  
 Simultaneous to the war, federal legislation legally alienated the surviving 
Dakota from their land as the U.S. Congress exercised its plenary power over all 
American Indian nations. The 1887 General Allotment (Dawes) Act passed by the 
U.S. Congress legalized the expropriation of Indian land throughout the U.S., 
resulting in high levels of structural violence via the denial of the basic necessity 
of land. By the time of the nation-wide Allotment Act, however, the U.S. 
government had almost entirely legally alienated and disestablished the Dakota 
from their land. Combined with a series of fraudulent cases and misleading 
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taxation regulations, the immediate-term result of the Allotment Act was 
Indigenous peoples’ of loss of approximately 60 million acres their land.  
 The long-term effects of physical violence and land expropriation 
devastated the Dakota nation. Fractionated land ownership (the division of land 
into smaller and smaller parcels as inheritance trickles down the generations) and 
the “checkerboard” effect (whereby land ownership on reservations is divided 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous individuals) have resulted not only in 
extreme economic difficulties and challenges in accessing natural resources, but 
also in political, cultural, and social hardships. Internal to the Dakota nation, 
decades-long legal battles between Dakota people over land ownership have 
resulted in intra-community strife. In contemporary times, however, many people 
in the Dakota community, as well as other American Indian nations, are involved 
in combating the continuing process of land alienation. 
 
The Acholi 
 
 The British colonization of officially Uganda divided the fledgling country 
into agriculturally productive and unproductive zones, deeming Northern Uganda, 
home to the Acholi people, to be unproductive. The ethnic divisions mainly 
created by colonization continued after Uganda’s independence in 1962. 
Following decades of strife, the Northern Ugandan war began in 1986 after 
Yoweri Museveni’s rise to the presidency following his five-year “bush war” 
against Milton Obote, prompting rebellions in Northern Uganda.  
 Over the next two decades, hundreds of thousands of Acholis were killed, 
tortured, raped, or kidnapped by the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army 
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(LRA) and the national army, the Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF). 
Ninety five percent of the Acholi population was forced to resettle into Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. In 2010, the war had yet to formally end, with 
stalled peace deals in Juba, Sudan in 2008 leading only to the LRA’s movement to 
the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo where 
the rebel group continues its violence. Northern Uganda existed in a fragile 
atmosphere far from the violence of the 1990s, but also far from sustainable 
peace.  
 Various land privatization plans supported by the central government 
reinforce the widespread Acholi belief that Museveni began the war to alienate 
them from their communally accessed land. Where the war physically alienated 
Acholis from their land via death and forced internment, land privatization 
policies would legally maintain that alienation. The structural violence of land 
alienation often has the same ramifications as war: malnutrition, inability to farm 
and provide for oneself, deep difficulties in carrying out social, cultural, and 
political practices, and even death.  
 In addition to the violence presented by land privatization in the post-
armed conflict5 era, intra-community violence rages through Northern Uganda as 
bloody land wrangles occur between neighbors fighting over land delineation. 
Knowledge of land borders has decreased over the course of the war for several 
reasons: most elders who held the clan-based knowledge of land delineation died 
during the war; hundreds of thousands of young people lived virtually their entire 
                                                 
5 Although it is common to refer to the era after the LRA moved out of Northern Uganda as the 
“post-conflict” era, I choose to write “post-armed conflict” to emphasize that despite the LRA’s 
absence, conflict still riddled the region.  
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lives in camps without access to their ancestral homes; and the UPDF cut down 
the trees that served as physical boundaries of land holding. Resultingly, 
neighbors struggle—often fatally—to determine land ownership. And yet Acholis 
like the Gulu Concerned Landowners Association persevere, working to prevent 
the central government’s land privatization schemes and to decrease land 
wrangling. 
 
Indigenous Communities in Southern Mexico 
 
 The Spanish conquest of Mexico was marked by highly unequal land 
ownership that continued after Mexico’s independence in 1821. Latifundios, huge 
swaths of land owned by a single family, characterized both pre- and post-
independent Mexico; by 1910, one percent of the population owned 96 percent of 
the land.  
 As a result of the Mexican Revolution, the state created a program of 
communal land holding called ejidos. Beginning in 1910, the Revolution formed 
as a rebellion against dictator Porfirio Diaz whose 34-year reign was marked by 
violence and increasing agrarian inequality. Forces led by Francisco Madero, a 
wealthy oligarch from northern Mexico, battled Diaz, as did the troops led by 
Emiliano Zapata from central Mexico and Pancho Villa from northern Mexico; 
the latter two forces fought for agrarian reform, although they did not reach an 
agreement over the terms of that reform (Tutino 1986).   
 Stemming from this agitation for land reform, Article 27 of the 1917 
Constitution created the ejido system that legally redistributed land, making the 
resource both communally accessible and inalienable. Additionally, all water and 
 16 
land became property of the Mexican state. This constitutional rhetoric did not 
directly translate into the widespread system overhaul that the Zapatistas fought 
for during the Revolution; ejidos were not distributed until the 1934 election of 
Lazaro Cardenas and not all those who petitioned to become ejiditarios 
successfully received land. The bureaucratic agrarian redistribution process 
continued for decades after Cardenas’ rule despite that agrarian reform remained a 
key platform of political rhetoric of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(Tutino 1986).  
 The rise of neoliberalism in Mexico, however, radically disrupted Article 
27, and began a process of land consolidation in the hands of the elites—this time 
represented by domestic and international corporate interest. The 1989 “Reform 
of the Countryside” implemented by then-President Carlos Salinas, followed by 
the 1992 Agrarian Law, effectively ruptured agrarian reform and impoverished 
Mexican farmers (many of whom are also indigenous) by legalizing the alienation 
of land. Coupled with other harmful agrarian measures of NAFTA, the ability to 
sell ejido land piecemeal through the Agrarian Law continues to erode the 
communal land base. Though this affected all Mexican farmers, it was particularly 
detrimental to indigenous communities who relied primarily on subsistence 
farming for survival (Lewis 2002). 
 Simultaneous to this legislation has been the militarization of southern 
Mexico by the recently combined Mexican army and police forces. Heightened 
military presences in Chiapas, Oaxaca and Guerrero have particularly targeted 
indigenous communities that oppose the change in land systems and the 
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increasing corporatization of Mexican agriculture. Massacres and political 
repression by the army are coupled with large-scale construction projects that cut 
through many indigenous communities, further decreasing safe land access. 
Physical violence targeting indigenous communities has been at the center of the 
low-scale war designed to protect state and corporate interests in natural resources 
in southern Mexico (Hodges and Gandy 2002).  
 
Theoretical Background of Resource Privatization and Capitalism 
 
 Using these cases as examples, I expand upon the plethora of scholarship 
by neo-Marxist and anti-neoliberal theorists who work at the intersections of 
capitalism, natural resources, and various forms of violence to theorize on the role 
of privatization in conflicts worldwide. In this section, I draw upon classical 
critiques of capitalism that describe the shift from communal natural resource use 
to privatized systems; these theorists also analyze the link between land 
privatization and physical violence. I continue by exploring literature critical of 
neoliberalism and exploitation of natural resources by the neoliberal system. I 
conclude by highlighting academic material that exposes the role of land access in 
global conflicts. My own research is situated in the nexus of these critiques of 
capitalism, natural resource exploitation, and global conflict.  
 Karl Marx (1867) describes the process of primitive accumulation as 
turning subsistence agricultural production into profit-oriented market production. 
This transformation, which separates rural peoples from ownership of or free use 
of land for their own sustenance, serves to “divorce the producer from the means 
of production” (Marx 1867: 874-5). Through primitive accumulation, 
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expropriated former communal land becomes privately owned land, which can be 
employed by its owner as capital—that is, to employ labor and produce a profit. 
The former subsistence dwellers of that land become exploited wage-laborers6. 
Massimo De Angelis (2001) argues that this process of primitive accumulation 
continues in contemporary times in varying forms including the privatization of 
publically-owned utilities, and David Moore (2004) continues by analyzing the 
connections between primitive accumulation and neoliberalism. Primitive 
accumulation is evident in all three of my case study populations: physical 
violence is the first step in expropriation formerly communal land and legislative 
changes complete the process of land commodification.  
 Peter Linebaugh (1993) and E.P. Thompson (1990) analyze the 
privatization of the commons in eighteenth century England, which was Marx’s 
example of primitive accumulation. Linebaugh traces the rise in Britain of 
property capitalization and the simultaneous use of capital punishment for those 
who committed crimes against private property; he states that “the forms of 
exploitation pertaining to capitalist relations caused or modified the forms of 
criminal activity, and second, that the converse was true, namely, that the forms of 
crime caused major changes in capitalism” (Xxiii). Thompson describes the 
enactment of the Waltham Black Act in May 1723, which allowed for the death 
penalty for crimes against property, which included “hunting, wounding or 
stealing red or fallow dear...maliciously killing or maiming cattle; cutting down 
trees....; sending anonymous letters demanding ‘money, venison, or other valuable 
                                                 
6 For a more in-depth discussion of primitive accumulation and its surrounding theoretical 
debate, see Massimo De Angelis's (2001) “Marx and Primitive Accumulation: The continuous 
character of capital's enclosures.”  
 19 
thing,” (22) among other charges. This meant that not only were the farming and 
hunting practices of people who used to rely on the land illegal, but criminal as 
well. This shift in conceptions and legal (mis)uses of “property” greatly hindered 
British farmers’ ability to self-subsist.  
 But primitive accumulation and the subsequent rise in capitalism is not 
exclusive to eighteenth century Britain. As Talal Asad (2000) argues, “capitalism 
and the associated culture that many call be the name ‘modernity’ are promoted 
vigorously by powerful liberal states and business corporations, and followed 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm and of success, by other agents around the 
world” (26).  
 Tracing the rise of contemporary neoliberalism, Walden Bello (2005) 
argues against the exploitation by the G-8, the Bretton Woods Institutions (like the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), and the World Trade 
Organization. He states that “while governance...is often described as the function 
of these institutions, a more appropriate description of their role might be 
maintenance of the hegemony of the system of global capitalism and promotion of 
the primacy of the state and economic interests that mainly benefit from it” (1). 
The promotion of neoliberalism through these institutions and their state and 
corporate partners, he argues, is at the root of vast global inequality. Further, Bello 
points to the important role of agriculture in global free trade agreements, such as 
the 1995 Agreement on Agriculture, which granted “big agricultural superpowers 
[the legal right] to consolidate their system of subsidized agricultural production 
that was leading to the massive dumping of surpluses on those very markets, a 
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process that was, in turn, destroying smallholder-based agriculture” (72-73).  
 Battles for natural resources are on the rise throughout the globe as a result 
of this increase in neoliberalism, unequal policies of free trade agreements, and 
the so-called “modernity” that accompanies capitalism. Writing about water 
privatization in India’s Doon Valley, Vandana Shiva (2002) argues that the 
“destruction of resource rights...undermine[s] cultural identity,” later resulting in 
community competition “over scarce resource that define economic and political 
power” (Xii). She argues that water rights are natural rights that do “not originate 
with the state; they evolve out of a given ecological context of human existence” 
(20). Further, Shiva contends, community resource rights are “a democratic 
imperative...[that] hold states and commercial interests accountable” (31).  
 The role of land in global conflicts, particularly in Israel/Palestine, has 
also received considerable attention. Shaul Ephraim Cohen (1993) traces the role 
of the Israeli planting of a “green belt” of trees around Jerusalem in what the 
Israeli government calls “open” areas, despite Palestinian claims that the land is 
their ancestral farmland. Competing forestation practices between the Israeli 
government and the resisting Palestinian farmers plays a critical role in debates 
over the borders of Jerusalem and, more broadly, sovereignty and state legitimacy.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 
 Chapters 2-4 are divided by stage of violence, which corresponds roughly 
with the chronological order of forced land alienation. Chapter 2 explores 
physical violence in the form of war and militarization in Mexico, Uganda, and 
Minnesota, highlighting the role of colonization in the creation of unequal land 
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policies that led to war. This physical violence begins the processes of land 
enclosure necessary for the capitalist commodification of formerly non-capitalist 
land. Chapter 3 analyzes the legal change in land tenure system after the period of 
intense physical violence in each of these three societies, noting how juridical 
measures legalize alienation. In this chapter, I highlight how land alienation acts 
as a form of structural violence, completing the process of primitive 
accumulation. Chapter 4 discusses the effects of land privatization and alienation 
on my case study populations. This section also demonstrates the resulting intra-
community violence born from the combination of physical and structural 
violences; this frequently takes the form of legal disputes and land wrangles 
(skirmishes between neighbors regarding land delineation). In this chapter I also 
describe both historic and contemporary resistance to land expropriation by the 
Dakota, Acholi, and southern Mexican indigenous communities. Chapter 5 
concludes with an overview of my analytic claims and the theoretical implications 
of this project. I argue that capitalism is a form of violence and discuss the 
broader implications of that claim. I close by suggesting future areas of study.   
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CHAPTER 2:  
PHYSICAL VIOLENCE 
 
 In 1862, a group of Dakota soldiers declared war against the government 
of Minnesota by attacking Euro-American settlers living in Acton, Minisota 
Makoce. Bdweakantunwan Chief Little Crow, leader of the Dakota, led these 
attacks in protest of the Minnesota government’s violations of an 1851 land treaty. 
The Euro-American soldiers quickly defeated the Dakota, and hanged 38 Dakota 
soldiers—the largest mass execution in U.S. history. Furthermore, in retaliation to 
the attack, Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey ordered the Dakota Genocide, 
marked by forced removal, death marches, concentration camps, and mass 
execution. Far more than a barbaric “Sioux Uprising,” as it was coined by Euro-
Americans, the U.S.-Dakota War and genocide were based, in large part, on the 
expropriation of Dakota land by invading colonial forces.  
  I tell this history to link the physical violence in Minnesota, Uganda, and 
Mexico to broader struggles for land control as outside forces attempt to 
expropriate formerly communally accessed land. In doing so, I establish that in 
my three cases, outsider interest in commodifying land use resulted in physical 
violence in order to shift the preexisting land tenure system. Physical violence 
was the first stage of violence used as a mechanism for that capitalization proces  
 My cases differ from each other in many respects: different populations, 
land use systems, time periods, countries, and manifestations of physical violence. 
Despite this, they are united by a striking similarity; physical violence was used as 
a state mechanism for alienating the Dakota, Acholi, and indigenous Mexicans 
from their communal land and to begin the process of creating privatized land 
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tenure systems. As such, capitalism and resource expropriation became 
inextricably intertwined with extreme physical violence inflicted by the state. The 
“clearing” of the land via internment and death allowed for outside party land 
expropriation, later legalized through land privatization.   
Theoretical Background of Physical Violence 
 
As Antonius C. G. M. Robben and Carolyn Nordstrom (1995) contend, 
physical violence should not be presented as a static phenomenon; its “focal 
points multiply and...the center is a constantly changing nexus” (8). Due to its 
constant shifting, and my own position as an outsider, representing violence “is 
fraught with assumptions, presuppositions, and contradictions” (5). 
 Robben and Nordstrom argue that too often war is analyzed outside of 
political conflict, described by outsiders as a regression “to a level of inhumanity 
that is outside normal social life, an unreal world where soldiers enjoy kill and 
rape is a military strategy” (1995: 2). This assertion certainly holds in my three 
case studies; in popular media representations, the Northern Ugandan war is 
reduced to exclusively a battle for child soldiers, the Dakota Genocide becomes 
the “Sioux Uprising,” and quaint indigenous women in knit caps represent the 
Zapatista insurgency against neoliberalism in the Western imaginary. By 
demonstrating the link between economic and political struggle for resources and 
physical violence, I argue that these experiences of physical violence are highly 
political and do not occur outside of “normal” social life. Indeed, wherever 
capitalist land expropriation has occurred, some form of violence has been used as 
a mechanism to ensure the commodification of the resource. 
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    Case Studies: Physical Violence in the Dakota, Acholi, and Indigenous 
Mexican Communities  
Minnesota and the Dakota: The 1862 U.S.-Dakota War and Dakota Genocide 
 
Physical violence against the nations already residing in the land now 
known as the United States marks Euro-American colonization of the territory. 
The U.S. government justified its genocidal military, governmental, and economic 
policies with the expansionist rhetoric of Manifest Destiny, which deemed Euro-
American settling of western territories to be God-granted. The U.S. colonial 
powers drastically diminished the Indigenous population and altered the diverse 
land tenure systems in place before capitalist expansion through a combination of 
tactics, including armed conflicts, the spread of diseases like smallpox and 
chickenpox, forced assimilation policies, and land treaties that resulted in massive 
loss of Indigenous territory (Brave Heart and DeBruyn 1998).  
 Importantly, through the plenary powers given to the U.S. Congress under 
Article IX of the Articles of Confederation7, Congress—not states—negotiated 
directly with American Indian nations, who were legally recognized as political 
entities. Through the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act, the Constitution also gave 
Congress the sole authority “to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes” 
(Fletcher 2008: 170). Because of these plenary powers, the federal government 
negotiated American Indian land and trade treaties8.  
                                                 
7
 Article IX states that “The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and 
exclusive right and power of... regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, 
not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State, within its 
own limits, he not infringed or violated” (as quoted in Fletcher 2008: 166) 
8
 Importantly, the case of Worcester v. Georgia (1832) ruled in favor of the Cherokee nation, 
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 The Dakota were not exempt from colonial invasion. The Dakota nation in 
Minnesota is divided into the subtribes of the Mdweakanton, Wahpeton, Sisseton, 
and Mahpekute. The Dakota inhabiting area west of Minnesota included the 
Yanktonais and the Yanktons, with the Tetons living beyond the Missouri River 
(The Dakota Society of Minnesota). While Euro-Americans labeled the Dakota 
the “Sioux” (a word meaning “enemy” or “snake” in Anishinaabe), the word 
“Dakota” means “ally” or “friend” in the Dakota language (Harjo 2005: 31).  
 Prior to colonial invasion, the Dakota nation operated through 
the tioyapaye system, the basic sovereign unit based on a grouping of families 
similar to a village or municipality. In the tioyapaye system, there are several 
societies that serve different functions for the communities, including societies of 
warriors, hunters, police, identified political leaders, and spiritual leaders. 
Political and spiritual leaders work together to form the legislative function of the 
tioyapaye, which includes designating land use structures. Resource management, 
including land, is based upon need; sufficient land is set aside for hunting, fishing, 
and gathering and animals are contained to a specified area. The collective 
process for deciding land use is decidedly non-capitalist as leaders identified by 
the community take the tioyapaye as a whole into account when allocating 
resource use (Janis interview, 10 March 2010).  
 Beginning in 1824, the U.S. government forcibly transferred Dakota 
children out of the Dakota community and into boarding schools designed to 
“civilize” and Christianize Dakota youth. The Office of Indian Affairs, later 
                                                                                                                                     
stating that the federal government could protect the sovereignty of Indians if state 
governments violated that sovereignty.  
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renamed the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), created a program for educating 
American Indians under its “Civilization Program” (Brave Heart and DeBruyn 
1998). Removed from their families and communities, beaten for speaking their 
first language, and shamed for exhibiting any “native” characteristics, many 
Dakota children died of disease and homesickness in boarding schools run by the 
BIA or Christian missionaries (Brave Heart and DeBruyn 1998: 63). Physical, 
sexual, and emotional abuses were common and, without the “culturally 
integrated behaviors that led to self-esteem, a sense of belonging to family and 
community, and a solid American Indian identity,” many children who had been 
forcibly transferred to U.S. Americanization institutions were “ill-prepared for 
raising their own children in a traditional American Indian context” (Brave Heart 
and DeBruyn 1998: 64).  
 Additionally, land treaties signed between the Dakota and the U.S. 
Congress government damaged the Dakota’s ability to live in community in the 
ways possible prior to Euro-American invasion. In 1851, the U.S. government and 
the Wahpeton and Sisseton bands of the Dakota (“Upper Sioux”) signed the 
Treaty of Traverse des Sioux, which ceded all Dakota land in Minnesota, and 
parts of Iowa, to the Minnesota government except for two 150-mile tracts along 
the north and south sides of the Minnesota River, which were saved as 
reservations. In exchange, the U.S. government promised to pay the “Sioux” 
$1,665,00 in annuities and cash. Although Article One of the treaty states that 
“peace and friendship now so happily exist between the United States and the 
aforesaid bands of Indians [the Dakota],” Article Two continued by establishing 
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the U.S.’s massive land gain, to include  
all their lands in the State of Iowa; and, also all their lands in the Territory 
of Minnesota, lying  east of the following line, to wit: Beginning at the 
junction of the Buffalo River with the Red  River of the North; thence 
along the western bank of said Red River of the North, to the mouth 
 of the Sioux Wood River; thence along the western bank of said Sioux 
Wood River to Lake  Traverse; thence, along the western shore of said 
lake, to the southern extremity thereof; thence in a direct line, to the 
junction of Kampeska Lake with the Tchan-kas-an-data, or Sioux River; 
 thence along the western bank of said river to its point of intersection with 
the northern line of the State of Iowa; including all the islands in said 
rivers and lake.  
 
 Between the Treaty of Traverse des Sioux and the Treaty of Mendota,9 the 
Dakota lost approximately 24 million acres of land to the Minnesota government, 
who opened the land for Euro-American settlement. The Minnesota government 
granted the Dakota two reservations, each approximately 70 miles long and 20 
miles wide: the Lower Sioux Agency near Redwood Falls, MN, and the Upper 
Sioux Agency near Redwood Falls, Minnesota and the Upper Sioux Agency near 
Granite Falls, Minnesota. The arrangement dissatisfied the Lower Sioux in 
particular, as it displaced them from the woodland area that had previous been 
their home. Additionally, the U.S. government, rather than fulfilling their promise 
of $400,000 to the Dakota, instead gave that money to fur traders and people of 
mixed Indigenous-European heritage that had claims against the Dakota. 
 
The U.S.-Dakota War and Genocide  
 
 Dissatisfaction with the corruption of the 1851 land treaty provoked the 
U.S.-Dakota War and the subsequent genocide, which stand out as brutal 
                                                 
9 The 1851 Treaty of Mendota, signed between the U.S. federal government and the 
Mdewakanton and Wahpekute bands allocated $1,410,00 to those bands in exchange for their 
movement to the Lower Sioux Agency. This “opened” the majority of southern Minnesota to 
Euro-American settlers (“Treaties with Minnesota Indians”).  
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examples of U.S. government-sponsored mass physical violence. In 1862, with 
the backdrop of the Civil War raging on the eastern coast of the U.S., a group of 
Dakota killed Euro-American settlers living in Acton, Minisota Makoce in large 
part to protest the land treaty (Wilson 2005: 184). Shortly thereafter, the Dakota 
nation declared war against the Minnesota government in an attempt to recuperate 
the homeland upon which the Euro-American homesteaders increasingly 
encroached. The Dakota lost the U.S.-Dakota War against the better-organized 
U.S. soldiers after six weeks, in part due to secret treaties signed between some 
Dakota individuals and General Henry Sibley as part of the U.S. governments’ 
“divide and conquer” colonizing technique towards American Indian peoples 
(Wilson 2005: 187).  
 In retaliation for the war, Minnesota Governor Alexander Ramsey ordered 
the forced internment of 2,100 Dakota men, women, and children in concentration 
camps located at Fort Snelling and Mankato (Wilson 2005: 191). On September 9, 
1862, Ramsey addressed the Minnesota state legislature, stating that the Dakota 
“have themselves made their annihilation an imperative social necessity” (Wilson 
2005: 205). He continued by adding that “the Sioux must be exterminated or 
driven forever beyond the borders of the State” (Wilson 2005: 190). He then 
ordered the mass death and forced relocation of the Dakota people.  
 That November, 1,600 Dakotas were forcibly marched to concentration 
camps in the Dakota Death March of 1862. In the spring of 1863, the Minnesota 
government forcibly moved the 1,300 surviving Dakota (who had just spent a 
winter in the concentration camps under horrific conditions) to newly created 
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reservations in Crow Creek, South Dakota (Wilson 2005: 191). Meanwhile, the 
Minnesota government hanged 38 Dakota men, and roughly one third of the 
remaining prisoners died due to disease and poor conditions. The government 
placed bounties of $25 to $200 on Dakotas still residing in the Minnesota area. 
Due to persecution, those Dakota who had remained in their ancestral homeland 
fled throughout the Midwestern United States and north into Canada (Wilson 
2005: 192). Colonial William Marshall, the official in charge of the 1862 Death 
March, later became the governor of Minnesota (Wilson 2005: 199).  
During and after the U.S.-Dakota War, Minnesotan soldiers murdered 
Dakota people. Elsie Cavender, a Dakota woman, spoke of the experiences of her 
grandmother, Maza Okiye Win, who witnessed the murder of her grandmother 
during the death march to Fort Snelling in an oral history project conducted by 
Waziyatawin Angela Wilson. Cavender recounted the story of the death march 
and the murder of her great-great grandmother:  
 
[The Dakota] passed through a lot of towns and they went through some 
where the people were real hostile to them. They would throw rocks, cans, 
sticks, and everything they could think of: potatoes, even rotten tomatoes, 
and eggs. They were throwing these things at them, but the Indians still 
had to walk…Someone threw hot, scalding water on them. The children 
were all burned and the old people too. As soon as they started to rub their 
arms the skin just peeled off (196)… [As food, the soldiers] would just 
throw [bread] on the ground. They would have them sleep in either cabins 
or tents. …The meat was the same way. They had to wash it and eat it. A 
lot of them got sick. …It was on this trip that my maternal grandmother’s 
grandmother was killed by white soldiers. …The killing took place when 
they came to a ridge that had no guard rails. [She was supposed to look 
after the horses] but they couldn’t hold them still. …the soldiers came 
running to the scene and demanded to know what was wrong. But most of 
[the Dakota] couldn’t speak English…this irritated [the soldiers]…and 
they succeeded in pushing the older one off [the bridge] and she fell into 
the water. …the soldier came again and stabbed her mother with a saber 
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(197).  …Up to today we don’t even know where my grandmother’s body 
is (quoted in Wilson 2005: 198).  
 
 After being forced to endure horrific violence during the death march, the 
Minnesota government forced the Dakotas into concentration camps Fort Snelling 
and Mankato. Dakota Duane Schultz recounts the conditions during internment in 
Fort Snelling, stating that  
 
The Indians were confined in a fenced camp of tepees on the north side of 
the river. It was a gloomy, inhospitable site, on bottomland that turned to 
mud and offered no protection from the icy winter winds. Settlers ran off 
the Indians’ few horse and oxen and taunted them until eventually they 
grew bored. The army allotted the Indians only meager rations, typically 
bread for the adults and crackers for the children (quoted in Wilson 2005: 
202).  
 
 Many scholars (Wilson 2005; Cook-Lynn 2009) argue that these events 
constitute genocide under the United Nation’s 1948 Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). The Minnesota 
government’s actions against the Dakota specifically violate provisions several 
provisions of the CPPCG, including (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing 
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; and (c) deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part. Taken in the context of Governor Ramsey’s 
statements that the “Sioux” must be “exterminated,” violence against the Dakota 
is established as part of a policy designed to bring about the death of the Dakota 
nation. As such, Euro-American invasion and colonization of Dakota lands, 
events that heavily depended on capitalist expansion and land resource use, vitally 
connect acts of genocide to land expropriation.   
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Uganda and the Acholi: The 23-Year Civil War  
 
“They [the LRA and the government] are like two big elephants fighting.  
Who do you think suffers? The grasses.  
We are like the grasses.”  
 
-Odokos, interview participant 
 
Uganda became actively involved in the growing world trade system in the 
mid 19th century through trade with Egypt and Britain. During the British 
Protectorate (1894-1962), the colonizers divided Uganda into agriculturally 
productive and unproductive zones, with Northern Uganda categorized as the 
latter. While the Acholi were heavily involved in the ivory trade with Egypt10, the 
British favored the Baganda of the central Ugandan Buganda11 kingdom, 
appointing them to be civil servants in the Protectorate12. Contrastingly, the 
Acholi were relegated to the position of soldiers. The British created a system of 
private land tenure for the Buganda kingdom, which was not offered widely to 
other kingdoms in the fledgling country.  
 As a direct result of Britain’s “divide and conquer” policies, Uganda’s 
1962 independence found an ethnically divided country with uneven economic 
                                                 
10 British explorer Samuel Baker was sent by the Egyptian government to search for ivory and 
slaves, but received violent resistance by the Banyoro people; as a result, Baker wrote a book 
denouncing the Banyoro, causing them to be disfavored in the eyes of the incoming British 
civil servants and army, and thus lose half their territory under British colonialism. The Acholi 
had a better relationship with the Egyptians, becoming heavily involved in exchanging ivory 
tusks for guns firearms helped the Acholi maintain their independence from other areas, but 
skewed the balance of power within Northern Uganda as a system of unequal wealth 
distribution based on relative control of guns was born (Lange 2004).  
11 The origination of the name “Uganda” for the British-named country. The Baganda Kingdom 
includes the nation's capital, Kampala. 
12
 Baganda chiefs were charged with tax collection and general administration for the rest of the 
country as the Uganda Railway encouraged the trade in cash crops between East Africa and 
Britain. British demand for cotton grew, furthering the production of cash crops throughout the 
country despite the subsistence farming history of many of the ethnicities now incorporated 
into the protectorate. 
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access, particularly in regards to agriculture, and ethnically divided political 
parties. The regimes of Milton Obote13 (1964-71 and 1980-86) and Idim Amin14 
(1971-79) furthered ethnic tension. Believing the 1980 elections of Obote to be 
fraudulent, the National Resistance Army, led by Yoweri Museveni, led a five-
year “bush war” against the Obote government, leading to Museveni’s rise to the 
presidency in 1986; with heavy support from the U.S. and Britain, Museveni has 
ruled continuously since then (Lange 2004).  
 Today, Uganda has an ethnically and linguistically diverse population of 
about 32 million. The 2002 Ugandan census states that the population of Northern 
Uganda, the ancestral home of the Acholi people, is 1,45,437 people (five percent 
of the Ugandan population) and geographically encompass 12 percent of Uganda 
(Finnstrom 2008: 34). Northern Uganda’s Acholi region is composed of Gulu, 
Pader, and Kitgum, Amuru, and Lira Districts.  
 Acholis historically worked as subsistence farmers, producing millet and 
sorghum as staples in addition to sweet potatoes, cassava, beans, maize, 
groundnuts, sesame, squash, and other vegetables (Finnstrom 2008: 35). Before 
the war, they grew other products (such as mangoes, pineapples, avocados, cotton, 
sugarcane, tobacco, sunflowers, and rice) for consumption and trade, but the war 
devastated production (Finnstrom 2008). My interview participants, particularly 
the seven that worked as subsistence farmers, emphasized the importance of land 
as the primary means of eating, generating an income, supporting ones children, 
                                                 
13 A Lango from the north of the country, Obote’s rule was notably marked with the terrorizing 
and harassing of the Baganda people and others from central Uganda.  
14 Military commander Idi Amin overthrew Obote in a military coup in 1971, leading to an eight-
year reign of terror.  Estimates of killings during his rule ranged from 100,000 to 500,000 
people murdered (“Idi Amin”).  
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and providing a sort of spiritual solace. Solina, an older woman who works on 
rented land though she has communal land in a more rural area of Gulu, stated 
that “we eat land” (Solina interview, 16 April 2009) while the middle-aged farmer 
and father Otim William argued that he used his communal land for “farming cash 
crops and food crops” and described it as “wealth” (Otim William interview, 19 
April 2009). Grace, a middle-aged mother who no loner has land, told me that 
“land feeds the Acholi people and can keep my kids.”  Odokos, a high school 
student and Solina’s grandson, elaborated further, explaining that “before whites 
came with education, land was useful to make them survive with digging, 
planting, your properties, harvesting to eat, to make life easy” (interview, 15 April 
2009). 
  Land tenure is communal (often described as “cultural” or “customary”) 
and passed patrilineally through localized families and clans via male heirs; 
women have access to land only through their husbands and male heirs (Atkinson 
2008). Clan chiefs, called rwots, distribute clan land based historical use of 
specific plots (Odur interview, 24 April 2009). Non-clan members can use cultural 
land, but are unable to claim ownership (Atkinson 2008). Communal land is not 
titled and therefore often is not recognized as “owned” by the government and 
investors.   
Land also connects deceased ancestors with the living generation (Odur 
interview, 24 April 2009); farming cultural land provides a deep spiritual 
importance. Stella, an elderly woman, stated that “when I dig, that’s where I find 
it good” (interview, 21 April 2009). Properly buried ancestors provide the 
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continuity and link between generations of Acholis, vitally blessing the present 
generation and allowing for the flourishing of the Acholi people (Odur interview, 
24 April 2009)15. Communal land is the fundamental source that allows for this 
generational continuity (Odur interview, 24 April 2009). 
The LRA-UPDF War  
 
 Museveni’s 1986 presidential gain sparked instant rebellion in Northern 
Uganda. Though several armed rebel groups formed in the mid-1980s, the only to 
survive repression by the national army, Ugandan People’s Defense Forces 
(UPDF), was the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), led by Acholi Joseph Kony and 
comprised of Acholi fighters. While at first receiving support from many Acholi 
people because it represented resistance to the repression of the UPDF and the 
national government, the LRA soon lost that support as its violence ravaged the 
region and turned against Acholis themselves16. Reliant primarily on abducted 
soldiers, many of whom were children, the LRA murdered and tortured hundreds 
of thousands of Acholi, making rural subsistence farming a near impossibility. 
Simultaneously, the UPDF’s human rights atrocities, coupled with the horrific 
conditions in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, further exacerbated 
                                                 
15 Acholis honor their ancestors and promote family unification by burying the deceased on 
communal land. Because of this, Acholis consider graves sacred while simultaneously fearing 
them because of the power ancestors hold. It is considered unfavorable to step on or desecrate 
a grave and people fear that spirits will arise if graves are opened. Animal sacrifice, the 
creation of an abila (shrine), and the planting of ficus trees are three mechanisms for honoring 
ancestral spirits. Because these traditions depend upon communal land, the homestead is “the 
source of life, source of blessing, and source of continuity” (Odur interview, 24 April 2009).  
16 The LRA claims to be guided by a spirit; originally, this spirit was Christian in origin, but has 
since shifted to being Chinese in origin (Odur interview, 24 April 2009). Professor Odur, a 
Religious Studies professor at Gulu University, argues that had the spirit guiding the LRA was 
that of an Acholi ancestor, Acholi people would be more receptive to supporting the group. In 
Acholi cosmology, there are five main divinities (spirits): olalteng (the divinity of war), lapul 
(divinity of fertility), loka (of rain), baka (a mixed divinity), and lagoro (another mixed 
divinity). Interestingly, Joseph Kony, the leader and founder of the LRA, is from the 
geographic headquarters of olalteng, the divinity of war.  
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the terrorization experienced by the Acholi population. British and U.S. support of 
Museveni17, coupled with the support of the LRA by exiled Acholis, further 
complicates the conflict as it appears that those with the power to stop the 
conflict—the Museveni government, the UPDF, and the leadership of the LRA—
receive substantial power from its continuation18. 
Throughout the war, discourse surrounding land rights presented one of 
the biggest political battlefields as well as one of the most challenging practical 
obstacles to peace and stability. Military actions of both the LRA and the UPDF, 
coupled with the national government’s policy of internment of the displaced 
population, coalesced into the most devastating overall effects of the war: the 
increasing difficulty of land access and land security for the agriculturally-
dependent Acholi people. But many Acholis believe that the loss of communal 
land access is not an effect, but a cause in of itself: the impetus for the war, 
according to many, was outsider desire for control of fertile Acholi land for large-
scale farming and natural resource exploitation.  
 
The Government, the UPDF, and Land Issues  
 
Acholis widely believe that Museveni profited from the war. One 
interview informant told me that “the war has not brought [Museveni] problems, 
                                                 
17 The U.S. labeled the LRA a terrorist organization, increasing funding to the Museveni 
government to combat the group despite widespread claims of human rights atrocities on the 
part of the UPDF.  
18
 In 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Joseph Kony and four 
other top leaders of the LRA for war crimes, but failed to issue warrants for the UDPF 
commanders who have committed human rights abuses on par with (and in some cases, worse 
than) those of the LRA. Most Acholis I spoke with were vehemently against the ICC warrants, 
as it decreases the likelihood that Kony will negotiate and enact a genuine peace for Northern 
Uganda, and argue that a punitive justice system via luxury prisons in the Hague does not 
adequately address the needs of the Acholi.  
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only happiness because he knows he can do anything he wants. He insults the 
Acholi. Acholi people are like rotten mushrooms. [Museveni] can call for water, 
but they give him milk. If he wants the war to continue, he can continue” (Solina 
interview, 16 April 2009). Many blame the government for “causing the rebellion 
in Northern Uganda” (Otim William interview, 19 April 2009). As Otim William 
told me, “the government has no close relationship with the Acholi people” 
(interview, 19 April 2009).  
Many concur that “Museveni has taken people into camps” (Solina 
interview, 16 April 2009). During the war, Acholis either lived in Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, migrated to urban centers, or hid in the bush19 
(Komakech interview, 15 April 2009). By some estimates, two million people, or 
nearly 90 percent of the Acholi population, lived in camps during the height of the 
war (Atkinson 2008). In 2005, it was estimated that 1,000 people died each week 
in the IDP camps, but only 11 percent of these deaths were from physical 
violence; the vast majority of the deaths were from curable diseases and 
malnutrition. Of those not in camps, 40,000 fled across the Nile to Masindi 
district, while others lived in urban areas like Gulu Town, whose population grew 
from 40,000 before the war to 140,000 today (Finnstrom 2008:133).   
Some informants argued that forced movement to IDP camps “kept people 
in a poverty way” (Otim William interview, 19 April 2009). Finnstrom (2008) 
argues that “the forced mass movement of people to the camps must be 
understood in terms of military strategy,” despite governmental and NGO claims 
that IDP camps would protect citizens from physical violence (142). As military 
                                                 
19 The “bush” is the term used by Acholis to signify uninhabited rural areas. 
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officials believed all Acholis to be potential LRA collaborators, physical 
internment became an important military strategy. The physical set-up of the 
camp placed security forces in the center, leaving the residents of the IDP camps 
to exist as a “living shield” between the UPDF and the LRA who attacked the 
camps (Finnstrom 2008: 143).  
 Many people also believed that the camps served to intern Acholis so the 
government could seize their “open” land. An article published on 1 December 
1997 in one of Uganda’s daily newspapers, The New Vision, testifies to this claim; 
it states that “Museveni told Acholi [parliamentarians] that funds would come for 
tractors to help with large-scale farming that was part of the five-point program on 
the camps” (Finnstrom 2008: 175). Although these funds never arrived, 
Museveni’s claim points to a strategic purpose of the camps beyond physical 
protection: interning two million Acholis opened up land for large-scale corporate 
farming.  
 Simultaneously, the UPDF looted Acholi foodstuffs and general property. 
“They burnt my house, carried everything out, even all the food I grew, all the 
properties,” Opio Richard, who now works as a local pastor and owns a small 
vending stand, told me (Opio Richard interview, 18 April 2009). Many Acholis I 
spoke to said that their cattle had been killed or taken by the UPDF. Government 
soldiers took cattle via army lorries; resultingly, only 2% of the pre-war cattle 
remain today—significant because, while cows are not the main source of 
income, they are “very culturally important and the most prestigious form of 
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wealth” (Finnstrom 2008: 34)20. As such, “cattle looting is seen as a deliberate 
strategy to impoverish the Acholi so as to control them (Finnstrom 2008: 72).  
 
The LRA and Land Issues  
 
 Western media commonly represents the LRA as a force with no political 
agenda, indiscriminately slaughtering Acholis in its self-genocide. The group, 
however, does outline its political agenda, the primary aim of which is to oust the 
Museveni regime. Additionally, it releases statements on its policies regarding 
agriculture, health, education infrastructure, commerce and industry defense, and 
land and natural resources (Finnstrom 2008: 123)21. A key theme in the LRA’s 
political discourse is government and NGO policy in relationship to land and 
natural resources; political manifestos released by the LRA argue that paternalistic 
NGOs act to decrease Acholis’ ability to access natural resources. In one 
manifesto, the LRA writes that NGOs are 
 
masquerading as relief workers during trouble and times of war. 
But these organizations operate on a set agenda to deplete your 
natural resources [emphasis added]. Those operating among you 
are actually the shield and spears for Museveni against you. You 
should know they are in Gulu, Lira, Kitgum, or Apac not as relief 
workers, but to fulfill the agenda of Museveni. Do not be deceived 
that we [the LRA] have no political agenda. Where were the UN, 
the human rights agencies, and UNICEF at the time you were 
herded into the camps? (quoted in Finnstrom 2008: 42) 
 
 NGOs working in Northern Uganda must strictly adhere to the central 
government’s “humanitarian” plans, which are often heavily intertwined with 
                                                 
20
 In one case, the UPDF admitted to taking 871 head of cattle, but the “claimant wasn’t 
compensated and was accused of being a rebel collaborator” (Finnstrom 2008: 72).  
21
 The LRA further critiques the International Monetary Fund and World Bank's structural 
adjustment policies, arguing that they “achiev[e] low inflation and deregulat[ion] to the 
exclusion of other considerations” (quoted in Finnstrom 2008: 125). 
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military policy. Organizations’ involvement with the Museveni government 
inextricably connects their work to the destruction of natural resources. 
Additionally, many blame NGOs for creating a culture of dependency on food aid 
and thus fostering a lack of knowledge about agricultural production. The LRA’s 
articulation of these beliefs originally resonated with many in Northern Uganda. 
 However, many Acholis now discredit LRA claims of protecting natural 
resources, arguing that the group destroyed livelihood and land access because of 
their high levels of violence particularly in rural areas, murdering and kidnapping 
people while looting fields and food storage and destroying valuable property. 
The people I interviewed strongly opposed the LRA and believed the armed group 
to have no viable political goals. In response to questions regarding why the LRA 
took up arms, answers ranged from “because they wanted to lead the country by 
force” (Odokos interview, 15 April 2009) to “because of sheer stupidity” (Solina 
interview, 16 April 2009). All of my participants stated that the real impact of the 
war was on the civilians. Furthermore, “if they had cared about land, they 
wouldn’t let people stay in camps, just leaving land idle in the villages” (Milana 
interview, 16 April 2009). “They just slaughter [Acholis] like chickens,” Okelo, a 
man in his twenties who works his family’s communal land while studying to be a 
teacher, says. “So what are [they] fighting for? Kony just kills the Acholi people” 
(Stella and Okelo interview, 21 April 2009).  
 
Effects of Physical Violence and Displacement 
 
 A primary result of the war was the drastic reduction in land access. Much 
of the economic basis of subsistence farming was severely disrupted due to 
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physical violence, further challenging survival (Finnstrom 2008). A United 
Nations report released in October 2008 found that only one fourth of displaced 
Acholis had returned to their farms (Atkinson 2008). The rest still reside in urban 
centers or camps, which foster high levels of dependency on food aid22. The 
decrease in knowledge of farming practices and dependency on food aid creates a 
culture of “laziness,” according to elders I spoke to in an IDP camp in Kitgum; 
this makes farming difficult for younger generations after moving out of the 
camps.   
Land displacement and destruction also threatens cultural and spiritual 
survival. According to Gulu University Professor John Olanya Odur, alienation 
from the land equates to “nonexistence. You are completely uprooted from your 
ancestors.” Acholis “would have no origin, as if they’ve been wiped from the 
earth” because of the disconnection with the land (interview, 24 April 2009). The 
destruction of graves spiritually signifies alienation from the ancestors and thus 
the breakdown of the link between past and present that allows for the future 
(Odur interview, 24 April 2009). Rituals such as installing new chiefs are rendered 
nearly impossible, with no place to create an ancestral shrine, plant an ancestral 
tree, or sacrifice a goat, all necessary practices for this tradition (Finnstrom 2008).  
 In my interview with Okelo, he outlined his opinion on the effect of war 
on the communal land he shares with his elderly mother, Stella, in Laroo. He 
argues that the war 
 
has done many things. One, bullets that have not exploded. Once it rots or 
                                                 
22
 This dependency on food aid caused major disruptions when the World Food Programme began 
to withdraw its donations to the IDP camps in May 2009.  
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rusts, it becomes acidic to the soil. Two, some place in the village where 
many people were killed. People fear to go and till the land. They feel the 
demonic spirits, even the bones of dead or on the land. Three, it has scared 
the younger generation. Most boys have come to town instead of tilling. 
They resorted to singing. Four, it has polluted the atmosphere. Rain used 
to fall in March but now it doesn’t. That shows that the war has spoiled the 
atmosphere. Five, water has spoiled the most. It has led to numerous 
diseases like AIDS which is very hard now. All the soldiers are brought 
and just thrown here. Six, it has spoiled the family structure. The elders 
that were supposed to lead the people are the most stupid. They drink, not 
supportive, and don’t give advice. (interview, 21 April 2009) 
 
 While perhaps not all of the negative realities that Okelo outlines should 
actually be attributed to war (such as climate change), this eloquent explanation of 
the connection between war and the societal and environmental problems facing 
Northern Uganda demonstrates the holistic devastation caused by the war. 
Violence caused by both armed forces directly links to environmental and cultural 
destruction, with severe limitations to land access forming the basis for those 
devastations.  
 
Mexico and Indigenous Communities: The Militarization of Southern Mexico 
 
 Spanish colonialism in Mexico created a system of elite land domination 
for three centuries, notable for its “constricting peasant villages” and enormous 
latifundio system, whereby one family owned huge swaths of land (Tutino 1986: 
11-12). Small-scale insurrections of landless peasants against this inequality were 
quickly put down, save Father Miguel Hidalgo’s influential four-month rebellion 
in 1810 during which tens of thousands of peasants rebelled against the elite 
system. This was followed by small guerrilla revolts that sometimes continued for 
years. The period between 1810 and 1816 marked a shift from the relatively low 
conflict colonial system to “over a century of escalating conflict” regarding land 
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access (Tutino 1986: 12).  
 National independence in 1821 was not a social revolution nor did it bring 
peace to Mexico.  
Beginning in the late 1840s, rural insurrections over land reform became 
widespread as multiple agrarian uprisings challenged the latifundio system23. 
Porfirio Diaz’s rise to the presidency in 1876 successfully crushed the 
insurrections and augmented vast inequality in land ownership (Tutino 1986: 13).  
By the end of Porfirio Diaz’s 34-year dictatorship in 1910, “1 per cent of the 
population owned 97 percent of the land and 96 percent of the population was 
landless” (Lewis 2000: 404).   
 Conflict between the landed elites and millions of landless peasants 
spurred the Mexican Revolution, which lasted from 1910 to 192024. Troops from 
northern Mexico led by Franciso Madero, from the central state of Morelos led by 
Emiliano Zapata, and an additional group from northern Mexico led by Pancho 
Villa rebelled against the Diaz government, resulting in Diaz’s exile (and 
Madero’s rise to the presidency in 1911). These three armed groups differed in 
their visions of Mexico’s future, as Madero was from a very wealthy oligarchic 
family and Zapata and Villa both advocated for agrarian reform; Zapata and Villa, 
however, were unable to create a unified agrarian program, a move that could 
                                                 
23 For instance, the Ley Lerdo of 1847 “divested both the church and peasant communities of 
their lands” as “peasant communities were stripped of their patrimonies and peasants reduced 
to minifundistas on the margins of expanding haciendas” (Foley 1995: 59). 
24 It is important to note that the Mexican Revolution was not solely formed for agrarian reform, 
but “revolved around alliances and conflicts among numerous factions with varying programs” 
(Tutino 1986: 9). Divisions between the Mexican elites eroded support for Diaz, further 
allowing for a bloody war against the Porfiriato, as the Diaz's reign was termed For additional 
enquiries into the agrarian causes of the Revolution, see From Insurrection to Revolution in 
Mexico (1986) by John Tutino.  
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have increased their collective power (Tutino 1986: 338). After becoming 
president, Madero’s refusal to return land to peasants ended Zapata’s support for 
the new president, who  “attempted to restrain and if possible to demobilize the 
many agrarian rebels who had rallied to the fight against Diaz” (Tutino 1986, 
337).  
In 1911, Zapata released the Plan de Ayala, his vision for Mexican land 
reform, which would require large landholders to cede one-third of their land to 
landless peasants in collective holdings called ejidos. Fighting between Madero 
and Zapata’s forces continued as more joined the Zapatista army after Madero’s 
increasing demonstration of brutality. Zapata’s forces continued agitating for 
agrarian reform through the presidencies of General Victoriano Huerta and 
Venustiano Carranza, who “issued a series of decrees that finally recognized the 
rights of Mexican peasants to subsistence lands and community organization” 
(Tutino 1986: 339). Carranza’s acquiescence to agrarian reform succeeded in 
dividing Villa and Zapata, who had not come to a compromise reconciling the 
differences between agrarian needs for northern versus central Mexico. After 
Villa’s 1915 military defeat, Carranza shifted his agrarian policies again, this time 
to benefit the elites.  
Through Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, Zapata’s Plan de Ayala was 
legally enacted. This constitutional provision legalized collective land 
redistribution to peasants and recognized that “all land and water in Mexico 
belonged to the nation, which has the right to impose on private property 
conditions prescribed by public interest” (Lewis 2000: 404). Private property was 
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limited to 100 irrigated hectares of land and ejido parcels were set at a minimum 
of 10 hectares each. Crucially, this ejido land was deemed both collective and 
inalienable.  
 After Zapata’s death in 1919 and the official end of the Revolution in 
1920,25 political rhetoric espousing agrarian reform continued. Despite this, land 
redistribution did not become an instant reality, as “only the most persistent and 
often violent rebels, like the Zapatistas, received land from the new leaders of 
Mexico” (Tutino 1986: 6). By this logic, “only those who threatened the regime 
got land; thus those seeking land must threaten the regime. The early 1920s 
therefore brought numerous rural revolts, as villagers fought to claim the 
government’s attention” (Tutino 1986: 6). “By 1930, 93 percent of the 
324,805,000 acres registered by the census were private properties and only 7 
percent belong[ed] to ejidos” (Camin and Meyer 1993: 120). In the state of 
Morelos, the birthplace of Zapata, 59 percent of land was ejido controlled. In the 
urban Federal District (Mexico City), 25.4 percent of land was ejido controlled. 
Conversely, in the states of Baja California and Quintana Roo, less than 1 percent 
of land was accessed through the ejido system (Camin and Meyer 1993: 120).  
 After his election in 1934, Lazaro Cardenas began the process enacting of 
land reform and redistribution promised under the 1917 Constitution through his 
                                                 
25 The revolutionary conflict largely ended in a stalemate because of the different visions of two 
key factions involved in the opposition to Porfirio Diaz's dictatorship that led to the protracted 
armed conflict. One camp (represented by Madero and Carranza) held a vision of Mexico as a 
nationalistic, capitalistic country while an alternative vision (led by Zapata and his Zapatistas) 
held that the new Mexico should be an agrarian and anticapialist state (Tutino 1986: 10). 
Revolutionary Pancho Villa led numerous factions from northern Mexico whose 
“irreconcilable conflicts...no doubt contributed to Villa's eventual defeat” (Tutino 1986: 10).  
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“six-year plan”26. This was undergone in part to recognize the alliance of peasant 
groups that had supported his candidacy, and to increase dependency on the 
central government and pacify potential insurgencies. Over a six year-period, 
Cardenas expropriated 20,000,000 hectares (almost 50,000,000 acres) of rural 
land and distributed it to almost 800,000 rural families who became members of 
organized ejidos; 8.2 million acres of land on average were distributed each year 
(Camin and Meyer 1993: 143). This redistribution “finally  destroyed the landed 
base of Mexican elites” by allotting land to communities of peasant families 
(Tutino 1986: 347). This resulted in the 50% decrease of landless laborers in 
Mexico (Lewis 2000: 404). By the end of Cardenas’ rule, ejidatarios controlled 
almost half of all cultivated land (Camin and Meyer 1993: 132).  
 The six-year plan also attempted to provide sufficient water to agrarian 
communities and recognized the need for infrastructure and credit for peasant 
farmers. Additionally, Cardenas supported the organization of self-defense groups 
that would be able to protect the ejidos against attacks from “large landholders 
and their ‘white guards’” (Camin and Meyer 1993, 142). Cardenas’ 
institutionalization of agrarian reform also targeted commercial agriculture, with 
notable government expropriation of commercial farmers in the Yucatan and 
Michoacan. The result of this massive restructuring created a society in which the 
rural sector and agricultural economy—which now revolved around the ejido—
was the most important in the economy. Agriculture gave jobs “to the most 
                                                 
26 An increasing amount of the revolutionary leadership wanted increased land redistribution, a 
cause aided by the Great Depression which threatened the commercial economy that provided 
the income of the remaining members of the landed elite. Export markets almost entirely 
disappeared, “open[ing] up the possibility of completing” agrarian reform (Tutino 1986, 347).  
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essential sector of the population” (Camin and Meyer 1993, 142).   
 But while this marked an important moment for agrarian reform, the 
central government gained unprecedented control over ejidatarios as they were 
pressured to politically support Cardenas and commercialize their agricultural 
production. Ejidos were underfunded and “did not obtain resources to sustain 
local governments, which remained dependent on the favor and resources of the 
revolutionary regime. ...The reconstituted peasant communities of revolutionary 
Mexico received more lands than autonomy” (Tutino 1986, 347). By the 1960s, 
“the majority of rural families only possessed small plots of land were ever more 
dependent on seasonal wage labor” as the government pressed for commercial 
agriculture production (Tutino 1986, 348). Despite the failure of government-
supported land reform to create a truly self-sustaining and autonomous rural 
agricultural, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the ruling political 
party since the Revolution,27 maintained a discourse of agrarian reform “to 
present itself as the guardian of the Revolution” (Jones and Ward 1998: 77).  
 
Contemporary Militarization in Southern Mexico 
 
 While the Mexican Revolution provided the legal basis for land 
redistribution (although it was not entirely successful in doing so), lower-scale 
militarization of indigenous communities in southern Mexico (primarily in the 
states of Chiapas and Oaxaca) acted to alienate those communities from their 
collectively held land. Unlike the other two case studies, whose period of violence 
                                                 
27 The PRI was in power from the Revolution until 2000, when Vicente Fox's PAN (Partido 
Autonomo Nacional) gained power. 
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came prior to legalized land alienation via legislation28, this increasing physical 
violence and militarization occurred simultaneous to the rise in the national 
government’s support for neoliberal economic policies. While I describe Mexico’s 
move towards neoliberalism in the next chapter, in this section I highlight the 
militarization of southern Mexico and physical violence targeted at indigenous 
communities who opposed the neoliberalization of their former collective land.  
  While the rhetoric of militarization (and its U.S. support) deploys rhetoric 
of combating crimes and drugs, critics claim that the military actually protects the 
increasing number of multinational companies that have used changes in land use 
policy (altered under the 1992 Agrarian Law) to exploit natural resources for 
corporate gain. Because Mexico is the “top destination in Latin America for 
foreign direct investment, particularly in extractive industries,” multinational 
corporations have clamored to begin natural resource exploration (Miller 2009). 
Since 2006, “multinational companies have received over 80 federal mining 
concessions in just Oaxaca, covering 1.5 million acres of land. Mining is only the 
tip of the iceberg: Other megaprojects include hydroelectric dam construction, 
tourism and infrastructure, energy generation projects, water privatization, and oil 
exploration” (Miller 2009).   
 With a backdrop of neoliberal economics and indigenous resistance, the 
Mexican army and policy integrated in a militarization process that specifically 
targeted indigenous communities. With local, state, and federal police forces now 
under the command of the army, military control in Chiapas, Oaxaca, and 
                                                 
28 In the case of the Dakota, although the 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux did legally alienate 
the Dakota from their land, the legislation I refer to is the 1887 Allotment Act, which was 
much wider in its scope.  
 48 
Guerrero have become low-scale war zones. The Public Security Police utilizes 
“army vehicles, weapons, and tactics but have blue uniforms instead of green” 
(Stephen 2000: 829). This army integration expanded military coverage into areas 
of Chiapas and Oaxaca that were previously inaccessible to military forces, 
usually by establishing permanent residence in rural indigenous communities” 
(Stephen 2000: 829). Large-scale construction projects such as roadways “have 
been undertaken to support the increasing number of troops in Chiapas, a move 
that greatly disrupts the communities that the roads traverse” (Stephen 2000: 828).  
 U.S. aid funds this militarization project under the 2008 Merida 
Initiative29, which operates under the stated goal of combating the drug trade and 
increasing border security in Mexico and Central America. The U.S. congress has 
signed off on $1.6 billion dollars for the six-year plan. U.S. financial support for 
Mexican militarization pre-dates these contemporary programs; “between 1996 
and 1997 alone, U.S. anti-narcotics funds allotted to Mexico jumped by 400%” 
(Fernandes 1999: 49). Much of that funding was used for increases in 
militarization.  
 The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP), launched 
in 2005 by U.S. President George Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, 
and Mexican President Vicente Fox, created a regional security program designed 
to protect NAFTA, the tripartite neoliberal economic model. In 2007, then- U.S. 
assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs explained that the 
basis of the SPP “understands North America as a shared economic space” which 
                                                 
29 Critics of the program have dubbed it “Plan Mexico,” a reference to the U.S.-funded Plan 
Colombia.  
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“we need to protect...more broadly throughout North America” via “security 
cooperation;” he continued by explaining that “to a certain extent, we’re armoring 
NAFTA” through the SPP (Carlsen 2008). The regional security agreement is an 
acknowledgement that neoliberal economics necessitates military protections.  
 Despite Mexican government claims that U.S. aid money went towards 
combating organized crime and drug cartels, human rights groups argued that 
force is increasingly used against community members to “protect the interests of 
multinational corporations” (Miller 2009). Indeed, there have been many 
instances of indigenous massacres caused by military troops over the past two 
decades. In 1995, 17 peasants activists were shot and killed by state police in 
Aguas Blancas, Guerrero (Stephen 2000: 826). In the two months leading up the 
July 1997 elections, “dozens of people were killed and wounded in local 
confrontations between the PRI, the PRD, and the violence caused by paramilitary 
forces and even federal police forces” in Chiapas (Stephen 2000: 828). In 
December 1997, a massacre led by a paramilitary group composed of members of 
“the local PRI, armed and trained by state policy and an ex-soldier from the 
Mexican army” killed 45 Tzotzil people praying in a village church in Acteal, 
Chiapas (Stephen 2000: 828). Many of these massacres targeted alleged 
sympathizers of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN, or the 
Zapatistas), a movement primarily of indigenous people based in Chiapas, which 
challenges the hegemonic neoliberalism of the Mexican government and its 
corporate partners (Hodges and Gandy 2002). More than one-third of Chiapas has 
been militarized since the 1994 Zapatista uprising with approximately one soldier 
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for every three or four inhabitants of an indigenous community  (Stephen 2000: 
828). In August 1999, approximately 37,000 troops “surrounded three [indigenous 
pro-Zapatista] communities which have a combined population of no more than 
500;” despite this, the vast majority of the Zapatista communities “are unarmed, 
defending themselves only with fistfuls of stones and barricades of their own 
bodies” (Fernandes 1999: 2).  
Reacting to a series of military attacks carried out by the Popular 
Revolutionary Army (EPR, an armed leftist movement operating out of Guerrero 
that declared war against the Mexican government in 1996), the military arrested 
“most of the municipal government of San Agustin Loxicha…between October 
and December 1996, as suspected members of the EPR” (Stephen 2000: 828). 
“Since the fall of 1996, more than 2000 indigenous people—including 
teenagers—have been imprisoned after raids in which Federal Judicial Police 
entered houses and rounded people up while the army maintained watch” 
(Stephen 2000: 828).  
 In another example of brutal militarization, protests against the Trinidad 
mine in San Jose del Progreso, Oaxaca ended on May 6, 2009 when 700 police 
forces “stormed into the community in anti-riot ger along with an arsenal of tear 
gas, dogs, assault rifles, and a helicopter” (Miller 2009). Community members 
were organizing against the Canadian mining company, Fortuna Silver Mines. 
“The result was a brutal attack, with over 20 arrests and illegal searches of homes. 
Police seemed to be going after a heavily armed drug cartel, not a community 
protest” (Miller 2009).  
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 Whereas the Mexican Revolution legally created collective land tenure, 
the current war carried out by the Mexican state against communities in Chiapas, 
Oaxaca, and Guerrero is a violent attempt to alienate indigenous communities 
from their communal land. Because Mexico’s neoliberalization is dependent upon 
land privatization and exploitation, the state targets communities who resist 
neoliberal policies to maintain their collective land holding. Physical violence is 
needed to accompany the piecemeal privatization of land through the 1992 
Agrarian Law, which will be outlined in greater detail in the next chapter. 
 
Concluding Comparative Discussion 
 
 The enactments of physical violence in Minnesota, Uganda, and Mexico 
vary greatly. In Minnesota, genocidal colonial violence decimated American 
Indian populations; I focus, however, solely on the U.S.-Dakota War and 
genocide, which specifically targeted the Dakota Nation in the aftermath of the 
fraudulent 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux. In Uganda, the Northern civil war 
focused on the Acholi, but the physical violence occurred against a backdrop of 
decades of violence initiated by British colonial policies and uneven agricultural 
support from the government. In Mexico, the most divergent case, the violent 
Mexican Revolution served to enact legal land redistribution; fifty years later, the 
militarization of indigenous communities in southern Mexico coincided with 
neoliberal economics that abolished the Revolution’s land reforms. This violence 
targeted communities actively opposed to the neoliberal policies that serve to 
alienate collective landholding.   
 Rhetoric surrounding state-sponsored physical violence portrayed the 
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target populations as barbaric and uncivilized, linking market reforms and 
capitalist land tenure systems as a key part of the civilizing project. All three 
experiences of physical violence were predicated on outsider desire for a radical 
change in the communal land tenure system to a privatized, market-based system. 
The process of violently “clearing” communally-held land via death and forced 
internment allowed the state, corporations, and settlers to purchase that “open” 
land and thus shift the land access system to a privatized one. Physical violence 
served as the impetus for the land expropriation process that Marx calls primitive 
accumulation.  
 But the violence of war and militarization does not begin and end with 
itself; state-enacted legislation continues the process of land alienation first started 
through physical violence. In the next chapter, I show that legal land alienation 
followed physical violence in all three of the cases. The results of such legal 
changes amounts to structural violence, the next stage in the relationship between 
forced land privatization and violence.  
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       CHAPTER 3: 
STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 
 
 The 1992 Agrarian Law in Mexico radically altered the 1917 Mexican 
Constitution, legally changing the most important constitutional provision of 
agrarian reform born from the Mexican Revolution. Under the new law, 
individuals and investors can now buy formerly inalienable, communal land. 
Enacted as a prelude to the 1994 passage of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), the Agrarian Law legalized the radical alteration of 
Mexican farmer’s relationship to land. As a result, the ability of Mexican farmers 
to provide for themselves was greatly hindered. The resulting emigration, 
malnutrition, and poverty came as a direct result of these legal changes30.  
  Chapter 2 described the cessation of physical violence in all three cases, 
but in no case did this yield a return to sustainable peace. Instead, where the 
violence of war physically removed communities from their land, legislative 
changes legalized alienation from the communal resource. The previous period of 
physical violence enabled these changes, as the land was left “open” by death or 
physical removal. This period ushered in a new stage of unrest in the form of 
structural violence, a term I use to describe the structural inequalities that lead to 
the slow killing of a population through the denial of access to its basic needs. 
Legally alienating communities from their land—a fundamental need of these 
populations—resulted in the widespread breakdown of social, cultural, and 
                                                 
30
 The case of violence against indigenous communities in southern Mexico differs from the cases 
of the Dakota and the Acholi in that physical violence (via militarization) and structural 
violence (via the 1992 Agrarian Law that changed Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution) 
occurred nearly concurrently. Despite this, I divide these two violences organizationally to 
parallel the other two cases in order to best highlight the relationship between militarization 
and changes in land law.  
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political practices; this led to malnutrition, homelessness, difficulty in accessing 
other natural resources such as water, and, in some cases, even death as 
communities were increasingly challenged to provide sustenance for themselves. 
My three case study populations now exist in different stages of these legal 
changes due to their varying time periods; a cross-historical analysis, however, 
suggests that despite temporal differences, legal land alienation reinforces 
physical violence to complete the process of outsider land expropriation necessary 
for implementing capitalism. 
 In this chapter, I analyze national land legislation that affects millions 
more people than my three case study populations, and argue that legislation that 
privatizes land is tantamount to structural violence, the second stage of violence. 
In the case of Uganda, I highlight national legislation as well as two proposed 
plans for Northern Uganda that will only affect the Acholi and others living in the 
region. In the case of the United States, I analyze the land treaties between the 
Dakota nation and the U.S. government as well as the 1887 General Allotment 
(Dawes) Act, which parceled out land to individual Euro-American settlers and 
American Indian people deemed competent by the government; the process of 
complete land alienation had already occurred for the Dakota by 1887, yet the 
Allotment Act remains an important example of the plenary powers of the federal 
government. In Uganda, I highlight the proposed Land Amendment Bill (2007), 
which is still blocked in the Ugandan parliament, and the proposed Madhvani 
Sugar Corporation and Gulu University expansion plans, both of which are also 
stalled due to fierce resistance. In Mexico, I evaluate the 1992 Agrarian Law, 
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which effectively ended decades of land reform first implemented through the 
1917 Constitution.  
Theoretical Background of Structural Violence 
 
 I ground this chapter in theories of structural violence, systemic or 
structural inequality that leads to avoidable death. As my key points of departure, 
I use theories of Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung, credited with conceiving 
the theory of structural violence and founding the academic discipline of peace 
and conflict studies, and U.S. American medical anthropologist Paul Farmer. I 
expand upon Galtung and Farmer’s work on structural violence to include the 
example of the inability to access communal land because of national legislation 
as a form of this violence. As such, I argue that my case study populations have 
all experienced structural violence due to the legalization of land alienation by 
their national governments.  
 Galtung (1969) argues against narrow conceptions of violence “according 
to which violence is somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health alone (with 
killing as the extreme form), at the hands of an actor who intends this to be the 
consequence” (168). Rather, Galtung contends that “violence is present when 
human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental 
realizations are below their potential realizations” (168). As such, he expands the 
conception of violence to include systems that may not intend to cause suffering; 
he calls this structural violence, that which is “built into the structure and shows 
up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (170).  
 By way of example, Galtung argues that if someone died of tuberculosis in 
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the eighteenth century it would not have been an example of structural violence 
because the death was most probably unavoidable. If a person dies of tuberculosis 
in contemporary times, however, it is a result of structural violence because 
medical resources exist in the world to cure tuberculosis. As such, because the 
person was unable to access the resources necessary to cure her illness due to her 
unequal life chances, structural violence was the indirect cause of death. Other 
examples of structural violence include racist, homophobic, sexist, and/or classist 
structures that systematically deny (or give unequal access to) certain populations, 
thus resulting in that population’s higher death rates comparative to other 
communities.    
 Galtung argues that “if people are starving when this is objectively 
avoidable, then violence is committed regardless of whether there is a clear 
subject-action-object relation, as during a siege yesterday or no such clear 
relation, as in the way world economic relations are organized today” (171). 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1993) further highlights the structural violence that 
causes widespread delirio de fome (the madness of hunger) in rural Northeastern 
Brazil, tracing the slow death by starvation in an area that in fact has sufficient 
resources to support the population. Starvation and lack of direct access to 
abundant food is a form of structural violence evident in my case studies as well.  
 Importantly, Galtung further contends that it should not be assumed that 
structural violence leads to less human suffering than direct physical violence 
(which he calls personal violence). Galtung traces the relationship between 
personal and structural violences, ultimately arguing that while there is not 
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necessarily a causal relationship between them, “pure cases [of personal violence] 
are only pure as long as the pre-history of the case or even the structural context 
are conveniently forgotten” (178).  
 Paul Farmer (2001; 2004a; 2004b) expands upon Galtung’s work to 
analyze the relationship between structural violence, medical access, and global 
inequality. He argues that the distribution of medical ailments such as HIV/AIDS 
and tuberculosis, as well as human rights abuses, are “historically given and 
economically driven” (2004a: 17), tying the transmission of these diseases to 
poverty, extreme economic and social inequality, uneven distribution of both 
resources and the power to allot those resources, and disenfranchising political, 
social, and economic systems (2004b). Farmer contends that “control of lives is 
related to control of land, systems of production, and the formal political and legal 
structures in which lives are enmeshed [my emphasize added]. In each of these 
arenas, poor people overall are already laboring at a vast disadvantage; the voices 
of poor women in particular are almost unheard” (2004b: 91). As such, he argues, 
the high prevalence of diseases like AIDS in certain areas is not based on cultural 
difference or ignorance on the part of those who contract the disease; rather, it is 
the culprit of structural violence which, through historically-bound inequalities, 
denies populations control over their lives and potential to access resources 
(2004b).  
 Crucially, Farmer connects structural violence to physical violence, as “the 
adverse outcomes associated with structural violence—death, injury, illness, 
subjugation, stigmatization, and even psychological terror—come to have their 
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‘final common pathway’ in the material” (2004a: 308). Other adverse affects of 
structural violence include  “epidemic disease, violations of human rights, and 
genocide” (2004a: 308). According to Farmer, not only does structural violence 
enable and create these physical violences, but physical violence also enables 
structural violence in this relationship: “societies characterized by extreme 
inequality or structural violence...require other kinds of violence in order to 
maintain the status quo, which is so unbearable for the majority. In the United 
States, the enormous number of African Americans in prisons reflects this 
violence, as do death squads in Haiti and police brutality in Bombay” (2004b: 81). 
He furthers that “human rights violations are not accidents; they are not random in 
distribution or effect. Rights violations are, rather, symptoms of deeper 
pathologies of power and are linked intimately to the social conditions that so 
often determine who will suffer abuse and who will be shielded from harm” 
(2001: 40).  
 Kathleen Ho (2001) builds upon Farmer’s connection between structural 
violence and human rights abuses, arguing that “structural inequalities that 
systematically deny some people their basic human needs constitute a structural 
violation of human rights” (1).  She claims that the inability to possess equal 
power in distributing resources is “the pivotal causal factor of these avoidable 
structural inequalities,” leading to the structural nature of the uneven distribution 
of human rights (1).  
 While Galtung, Scheper-Hughes, Farmer, and Ho connect the inability to 
access resources to structural violence and human rights abuses, my project 
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extends the theoretical dimension of the study of structural violence by examining 
land access. Because they are denied access to their land, the Dakota, Acholi, and 
indigenous Mexican populations are challenged to decide the distribution of that 
vital resource. This forms the basis of other forms of structural violence prevalent 
in those communities such as starvation, high rates of disease in some cases (like 
the growing AIDS rate in Northern Uganda), and high levels of poverty compared 
to the rest of the national population. The structural component of this violence—
analyzed in this chapter as national legislation that legally alienates communal 
land—builds upon the devastating effects of war in terms of the drastic decrease 
in safe land access. The combination of militarization and capitalist legislation 
create the kind of unequal power structures, and avoidable deaths, analyzed by the 
aforementioned theorists. Continued access to safe communal land would prevent 
those deaths and enable more equal power relations, thus decreasing the slow 
death caused by structural violence.  
Case Studies: Land Policies in the Minnesota, Uganda, and Mexico 
Minnesota: Localized and National Legislation  
 
 In the late 1880s, after decades of armed conflicts with American Indian 
nations throughout the country and the 1862 U.S.-Dakota War (and subsequent 
genocide) in Minnesota, the U.S. government began to allot land to Euro-
American settlers and Indigenous individuals (The Message Runner 2002: 2). 
These land allotments frequently violated the terms of treaties that had been 
signed between Indigenous nations and the U.S. government after the cessation of 
armed conflict.  
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 Notably, the 1830 Indian Removal Act, passed under President Andrew 
Jackson, flagrantly breached those treaties.  The Act gave the U.S. government, 
via the executive, the power to relocate American Indians living in the eastern 
United States to reservations in the west based on treaties that were to be mutually 
negotiated between the indigenous groups and the U.S. government (Black 2007: 
186). The Removal Act also allowed for the president to negotiate land exchanges 
with Natives and pay for “improvements” on land such as barns and orchards. The 
executive was also allotted $500,000 for transportation costs from the east to the 
west (Cave 2003: 1333).  
 The legislation legally granted the president “the same superintendence 
and care over any tribe or nation in the country to which they may remove…now 
that he is now authorized to have over them at their present places of residence” 
(Black 2007: 186). While the Indian Removal Act dealt solely with Indigenous 
populations residing in the eastern United States (as states like Minnesota were 
not yet part of the Union), it set the legal and moral grounds for the U.S. federal 
and state governments to enact populations of forced migration and internment in 
newly created reservations as was seen after the U.S.-Dakota War. Although 
Congress did not authorize the forcible resettlement of the populations or the 
abuse of American Indian treaty rights, coercion, fraud, and corruption were 
rampant both in negotiating removal treaties with Native groups and in the 
execution of the relocation itself (Cave 2003: 1337). 
 The reservation system was a key piece of U.S. government land 
allotment policy. Believing that American Indian people could be better controlled 
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if put in a confined location, the U.S. government formed reservations as a means 
of enabling this control process while creating the Indigenous displacement 
necessary for Euro-American expansion. Exclusive land use within the boundaries 
of reservations was reserved for Indigenous populations, while “pressure for more 
land from mining, railroad, timber and homesteading interests began to build” 
(The Message Runner 2002: 2). The process of forced migration after the U.S.-
Dakota War set the groundwork for many of these reservations in the Upper 
Midwest.   
Given this broader context, the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, 
named after its key sponsor Senator Henry Dawes of Massachusetts, was the 
pivotal allotment policy that led to the expropriation of American Indians lands 
for Euro-American use throughout the U.S., leading to enormous loss of land, 
displacement, fractionation of land, and the erosion of “the very basis of the 
culture” (The Message Runner 2002: 2) that was based on communal access to 
land. By the time that the Allotment Act was passed, however, all Dakota land had 
been effectively alienated from the Dakota people through the Treaties of 
Mendota and Traverse des Sioux. As such, the Allotment Act served to nationally 
implement the land expropriation and alienation process that had already fully 
occurred for the Dakota of the Upper Midwest.  
The Allotment Act legalized the reduction of reservations to give land to 
homesteaders and to move indigenous peoples to the western U.S. (Black 2007: 
185). The government granted 160 acres of land to each head of family and 80 
acres to single males over age 18. Land beyond the allotment given to adult 
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American Indians was deemed “in excess of Indian needs” (The Message Runner 
2002: 2) and therefore open for non-Indian acquisition. “The immediate tribal 
land losses through the Allotment act provisions were estimated to total 60 million 
acres;” meanwhile, Indian groups were not monetarily compensated for their land 
and lands granted through the previous treaties were expropriated (The Message 
Runner 2002: 2). In response to the Allotment Act, emissaries from American 
Indian nations traveled to Washington D.C. to lobby against the allotment of 
Indigenous lands, though “Indian people were not consulted for approval or 
disapproval” (The Message Runner 2002, pp. 2).  
The Bureau of Indian Affairs held those land titles in trust for the first 25 
years after the passage of the Allotment Act and only gave American Indians land 
titles if they had complied with government mandated farming (Black 2007: 
190)31. The Burke Act of 1906 allowed for the federal government to legally hold 
those lands until Indigenous individuals were deemed “competent” (The Message 
Runner 2002: 2). When allotted land moved from trust status (controlled by the 
federal government), the allottee was given a “fee patent” which signified 
complete ownership of the land. Fee patents, however, were not necessarily given 
at the request of the individual; this situation was known as “forced-fee patents” 
(The Message Runner 2002: 2).  
Because many individuals “did not understand the principle of taxation,” 
their land was sold at public auctions, most often to non-Indigenous individuals 
(The Message Runner 2002: 2). Indigenous land ownership was further eroded 
when Indigenous people sold part of their land in order to pay taxes. In some 
                                                 
31 This could be considered one of the U.S. government's first structural adjustment policies.  
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cases, American Indian soldiers in the U.S. army would return home to find that 
their land had been sold during their military service. At times, land changed from 
trust to fee status without the notification of the Indian owner, further augmenting 
the amount of lost land (The Message Runner 2002: 2). Because of the poverty 
resulting from the change in economic systems, many American Indian people—
including Dakotas—sold their land for cash in often-corrupt deals, allowing for 
the federal government to repossess the land. As a result, over the fifty years after 
the Allotment Act was passed, the U.S. government repossessed over 80 million 
acres of land from Indigenous possession (Black 2007).  
The 1889 Nelson Act, named after Minnesota congressman Knute Nelson, 
served as Minnesota’s implementation of the Allotment Act. While the Nelson Act 
did not directly affect the Dakota, it provides a crucial broader context for the 
implementation of Minnesota government land policy in the Allotment Act era. 
The Nelson Act called for the relinquishing of all Chippewa32 reservations except 
for the Red Lake and White Earth Reservations in north central Minnesota. The 
rest of the Chippewa’s land, given to them under previous government-negotiated 
treaties, would be ceded to the government to be categorized as pine or 
agricultural lands and later sold on the market; profit gained from the sale of land 
would be placed in a fund for members of the Mille Lacs Band, who previously 
resided on the Mille Lacs reservation and would be forced to move under the 
provisions of the Nelson Act (Wedll 2009).  
The Nelson Act appointed three commissioners to negotiate the bill and 
                                                 
32 The Chippewa of Canada call themselves the Ojibwe; “Chippewa” is the word used in 
Minnesota. See http://www.whitearth.com and http://millelacsobjibwe.org for more 
information about the White Earth and Mille Lacs Bands.  
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required two-thirds of adult males on reservations to approve its terms. Henry 
Rice was the assigned Minnesotan commissioner to the Mille Lacs Reservation 
and promised the elders present that they would not cede their rights to the 
reservation if they signed the treaty. Elders agreed to sign the treaty under the 
pretense that Rice would maintain his promise and that the government would 
respect an 1864 federal treaty stating that the Mille Lacs Band would not be 
forced to leave their homes on the reservation. After the Mille Lacs signing of the 
Act, Minnesota Senator D.M. Sabin additionally injected language validating  
non-Mille Lacs individuals rights to the Reservation land; Sabin had claims to 
timber on the Reservation (Wedll 2009).   
The Act allowed for the Mille Lacs Band to maintain land on their 
reservation or move to the White Earth Reservation. Though promised monetary 
compensation for health care and education from the sale former reservation land, 
Mille Lacs Band members rarely received money from the government and by 
1924 the Mille Lacs Reservation was inhabited by only 284 Band members. 
Today, after generations of legal battles and struggles, about 2,050 Band members 
live on the Mille Lacs Reservation (Wedll 2009)33.   
 The 1935 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) ended the allotment policy 
created by the 1887 Act while simultaneously extending the trust system in 
perpetuity, legalizing paternalism that treated people as children who could not 
care for their own land. As such, the plenary powers of the federal government 
were deemed absolute with no limiting authority, as normal restrictions of land 
                                                 
33 For more information about the White Earth Reservation, see The White Earth Tragedy: 
Ethnicity and Dispossession at a Minnesota Anishinaabe Reservation by Melissa Meyer 
(University of Nebraska Press, 1999).  
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management did not apply to the government. Another aspect of the IRA was the 
creation of constitutions that more reflected the U.S. political system; nations 
were given a “choice” as to whether or not to adopt these constitutions, but with a 
deeply rooted history of forced paternalism and violence did not make declining 
the IRA constitutions a viable option for the vast majority (Janis interview, 10 
March 2010).  
Where the U.S.-Dakota war and other armed conflicts forcibly removed 
the Dakota from their land via concentration camps and murder, federal land 
policies cemented land alienation and, by extension, alienation from the 
economic, social, political, and cultural practices connected to this invaluable 
resource. Land expropriation disallowed American Indian use of land, made 
accessing resources much more challenging (if not impossible), and divided 
communities through the parcelization of land. This served as a continuation of 
colonialism’s global “divide and conquer” policy, internally tearing apart 
communities and legally cementing the effects of war. As such, federal land 
policies acted as a manifestation of Galtung’s structural violence on all of the 
Indigenous nations in the U.S., including the Dakota. Because of the Dakota’s 
experience of war and genocide, however, this structural violence augmented 
already severe physical violence.  
Land loss had a “checkerboard” effect,” whereby land ownership on 
American Indian reservations was mixed between Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
ownership, creating significant challenges to land access, resource use, economic 
growth, and perpetuating cultural practices on Indian reservations. Because land 
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ownership is divided it can be difficult to access natural resources, such as river 
fishing sites, which are next to privately owned, non-Indian land. Furthermore, 
because land ownership was inherited through undivided interest, future 
generations inherited parcels of land, but the size of each divided parcel did not 
increase by generation. Because ownership of land—though not parcel size—was 
divided, “the ownership of their allotments began to be spread among a large 
number of succeeding heirs” (The Message Runner 2002: 2). In contemporary 
times, more than 100 individuals now own some land parcels that were given to 
one individual through the Allotment Act. “As the land base became more 
fractured, the cohesiveness of the Indian community continued to disintegrate” 
(The Message Runner 2002: 2).  
 As a result of colonial legal policy towards the Dakota, today communities 
are dependent upon the federal government for subsidies and stuffs; divisions 
form between those who established working relationships with the federal 
government and those who did not. This factionalization is a direct result of the 
U.S. government’s paternalistic legal policies, including its push for the 
constitutional governing policies created under the 1835 Indian Reorganization 
Act.  
The effect of U.S. government policy can also be seen in the language loss 
experienced by the Dakota nation; according to Waziyatawin Angela Wilson, in 
2005 there were only nine fluent speakers of Dakota, two of whom are also 
language instructors. The trend of Indigenous language loss is not unique to the 
Dakota; in the late 1990s, the director of the Native Alaska Language Center at 
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the University of Alaska, Fairbanks, Michael Krauss, created four categories of 
surviving Indigenous languages. According to this classification, “Class A 
includes the 34 languages still spoken by all generation, including young children; 
Class B includes the 35 languages spoken only by the parental generation and 
older; Class C includes the 84 languages spoken only by the grandparental 
generation and older; [and] Class D includes the 57 languages spoken only by the 
very elderly, usually fewer than 10 persons;” class A represents the languages that 
are not in immediate danger of becoming extinct (Wilson 2005: 110). 
Black (2007) argues that during implementation of the Allotment Act, 
many American Indian people and groups reappropriated Euro-American and 
U.S. discourse about the Indigenous as a method of resistance against the land 
allotment policy. Indigenous resistance to the Dawes Act called out the U.S. 
government and Euro-American settler ideals and rhetoric as baseless and at odds 
with their actions. Through collective memory invocation of paternal benevolence 
and the hypocrisy of the U.S. government, “the resistance-through-memory in 
American Indian anti-allotment discourses exists as an instance in which the 
dominance of the US government was weakened by Native agency” (Black 2007: 
199).   
 For instance, a communiqué released by the Choctaw Nation in 1894 
called upon U.S. hypocrisy, arguing that 
 
[a]s soon as the Indian receives his individual [allotment], the white man 
will be there with money in one hand, whiskey in the other, and soon the 
tribe will be consummated…This is absolutely what did happen when the 
Choctaws took land in severalty in Mississippi [in 1832] (quoted in Black 
2007: 186). 
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 In another example, Sarah Winnemucca, a member of the Piute nation, 
drew on Euro-American rhetoric of its supposedly superior “civilization” in order 
to criticize the Allotment Act and the violence of colonization. She denounced the 
U.S. government, stating 
 
O, for shame! You who are educated by a Christian government…Yes, 
you, who call yourselves the great civilizations….then you rise from your 
bended knees and seizing the welcoming hands of those who are the 
owners of this land, which you are not, your carbines rise upon the bleak 
shore, and your so-called civilization sweeps inland…but, oh, my God! 
Leavings its pathway marked by crimson lines of blood, and strewed by 
the bones of two races: the inheritor and the invader (quoted in Black 
2007: 193). 
 
Uganda: The Land Amendment Bill, the Madhvani Plantation, and the Gulu 
University Expansion Plan 
 
 Although the LRA left Northern Uganda in the mid 2000s, conflict 
surrounding land access has not abated as the national government proposes land 
privatization plans for Northern Uganda. The government considers land to be 
“open and “idle,” and thus available for purchase (Atkinson 2008); this generated 
controversy because much of that “open” land belongs to Acholis still living in 
IDP camps. “Regaining access to land will be one of the single most important 
factors determining peace, reintegration, and recovery in the region” (Atkinson 
2008:  2). Despite this, access to safe land seemed increasingly distant as smaller-
scale privatization of formerly communal land becomes increasingly common. 
According to Finnstrom (2008), “to lose their land is perhaps what Acholi people 
fear the most, and in the judicial vacuum that has accompanied the war, displaced 
people can do little to legally protect their interests” (179). My interview subjects 
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uniformly stated that displacement and legal land alienation results in poverty, 
malnutrition, homelessness, and both physical and cultural death for the Acholi 
people. 
My interview participants articulated that the central government had a 
strong interest in accessing Acholi land34. While many people did not know the 
specific actions of the government to possess that land, some suggested that 
Museveni aims to create large-scale farming plantations by “encourag[ing] the 
landlords to sell land to those investors by telling them they’ll be paid some 
money” (Milana interview, 16 April 2009). Others recounted scare tactics and 
high taxes for those with large land acreage; these taxes are impossible for the 
poor to pay. Okelo wondered, “If you’re a poor man, how will you pay all that? 
They take it” (interview, 21 April 2009) 35.     
 According to my participants, outsider interest in Acholi land was due to 
the size, fertility, strategic location of the land, as well as the strong possibility of 
oil reserves. The majority of my participants argued that said land still rightfully 
belongs to interned families. Milana, a young woman enrolled in Gulu University, 
believes that “they want the land to put factories, claiming they’ll bring 
                                                 
34 My interview participants also suggested that other outside parties interested in Acholi land 
include the Madhvani Group, Gulu University, Indians, people from Western countries, the 
Dinkas (an ethnic group from Southern Sudan), and the Alur, a Ugandan ethnic group that live 
on the border of Sudan (Milana interview, 16 April 2009; Otim William interview, 19 April 
2009; Stella and Okelo interview, 21 April 2009; Solina interview, 16 April 2009). 
35 While the majority of respondents were adamantly opposed to government intervention, some 
believed that the government could bring development. These respondents differentiated 
between land that is accessed through “land grabs” and land that will be used for development, 
arguing that “when they are just grabbing the land, that is not good. What we need is 
development and employment” (Milana interview, 16 April 2009). Interview subjects who 
favored government-sponsored development projects were all young adults or are early 
middle-aged, while the older generation fiercely opposed government intervention into Acholi 
land issues. Solina, an elderly woman, declared that “the government is really interested and 
wants to finish the Acholi people with all of their land. Museveni cannot steal the land with all 
the people around” (Solina interview, 16 April 2009).  
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development, but it’s a land grab. Acholi people don’t benefit because they take 
the money make to their countries [through] profit repatriation” (Milana 
interview, 16 April 2009). Another key problem cited was the difficulty of finding 
alternative residences after the privatized purchase of land. Odokos wondered, 
“Big companies and investors shouldn’t be able to buy land because where would 
the people go? It’s difficult and not good” (Odokos interview, 15 April 2009).36 
My interview informants varied slightly on whether or not communal 
Acholi land should be sold. My six middle-aged and elderly informants argued 
that Acholi land should exclusively belong to clans and connected the sale of land 
to war. “Customary land is not supposed to be sold but because of the war it has 
begun to be sold,” Solina declared. “The people who sell it don’t think because 
what are their siblings going to do if they sell the land? These stupid people want 
to sell land of their parents” (interview, 16 April 2009). Opio Richard told me that 
he lived on his customary land for years and he doesn’t “even know what a land 
title is. Nobody knows what it is” (interview, 18 April 2009). Otim William 
explained that in the Acholi tradition, “we replace generation to generation. We 
don’t sell [land]” (interview, 19 April 2009). Others simply stated that “land is not 
for sale. It is not good to sell or buy. This is cultural land” (Stella and Okelo 
interview, 21 April 2009).  
 This prophesies a catastrophic ending for Acholis if land access is no 
longer possible; Acholis would not be able to economically support themselves 
                                                 
36 Only one of my respondents, a young woman attending Gulu University, believed that the land 
was “huge...with no use” (Makamiko Claudia interview, 16 April 2009). She believes that 
investment could bring development to the area, although those investors should return the 
land back to its original owner after a period of five years (Makamiko Claudia interview, 16 
April 2009).  
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and future generations would not be able to survive. Opio Richard told me that 
without land “the Acholi people would not be there because of the struggles” 
(interview, 18 April 2009) while others believed that Acholis would migrate to 
neighboring countries (Otim William interview, 19 April 2009). Solina 
rhetorically asked me, “If I didn’t have land, what would my people eat? There 
would be a lot of poverty” (Solina interview, 16 April 2009) while Grace 
questioned, “Now that I have kids, how am I going to feed them? How am I going 
to feed them? How am I going to send them to school? If Acholi people had no 
land, they would be sleeping in verandas, on the balconies of some rich people” 
(Grace interview, 17 April 2009). Others were more blunt, stating, “If I didn’t 
have land, I would just die, because land is what we live on” (Stella and Okelo 
interview, 21 April 2009), “there would be famine” (Milana interview, 16 April 
2009), and “when you don’t have land, you are homeless. There is no food for 
you also” (Otim William interview, 19 April 2009). Solina told me that “all Acholi 
people feel pain” because of land takeovers (interview, 16 April 2009). Shaking 
her head, Stella mourned that because of the land issues “we are so sorrowful” 
(interview, 21 April 2009).   
 When I asked one elderly woman what would happen if Acholis no longer 
had access to land, she fatalistically responded that they “would end up dying” 
(Stella interview, 21 April 2009).  
 In what follows, I outline three different proposals that would further 
alienate the Acholi people from their land by eroding the communal land structure 
according to the majority of my Acholi interview participants.  
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The Land Amendment Bill (2007)   
 
 The controversial national Land Amendment Bill (2007) has stalled in the 
Ugandan parliament due to fierce opposition primarily from Acholi and Baganda 
parliamentarians. The Land Bill, according to the government, intends to protect 
land renters from illegal eviction by landlords, something that the 1998 Land Act 
—the last piece of national land legislation—does not grant because it does not 
penalize landlords for illegal evictions (Atubo 2009). Critics argue, however, that 
protecting the rights of poor land tenants is a guise to allow for wider privatization 
and governmental expropriation for use by investors (Omara 2008). This national 
2007 initiative follows the 1995 Constitution’s creation of a land law that 
promotes the conversion of customary land into a privatized land holding system 
and the 1998 Land Act’s expansion of that policy via the creation of land 
allocation institutions that bypass traditional leaders. The Land Act does, 
however, recognize communal land membership, provided it helps further 
community development (Atkinson 2008). When I raised questions about the 
Land Amendment Bill to my interview respondents, none had a clear idea about 
the specific provisions of the Bill or how it would affect them.  
 
The Madhvani Sugar Plantation 
 
The proposed creation of a sugarcane plantation on communal land in 
Amuru District by the Madhvani Group, a private sector conglomerate of 
agriculture-based companies in East Africa, is one of the most controversial 
proposed investment plans in Northern Uganda; the plantation would occupy 
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60,000 hectares of land (though the Madhvani Group has requested 85,000 
hectares from the Amuru Land Board), the majority of each belongs to people still 
residing in IDP camps. A court injunction currently blocks the plan, but if it were 
to go forward “at least 10,000 people face eviction” (as quoted in Atkinson 2008: 
4). Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh, is a key investor in the Madhvani plantation 
proposal, reinforcing the opinion that Museveni started the war to expropriate 
land for economic gain.  
 Many of my interview participants expressed concern that the installation 
of the sugar plantation would force Acholis to move away from subsistence 
agriculture production and towards a system of land use dependent upon Acholi 
wage laborers who would be permanently displaced from their communal land 
(Finnstrom 2008: 178). The result of creating a population of day laborers would 
be devastating: no longer able to feed themselves and largely stripped of their 
cultural ties, Acholis would be dependent upon investors for their survival and 
would most probably be permanently displaced. This process of contemporary 
primitive accumulation strikingly resembles the eighteenth century British 
expropriation of the commons. I was told that the plan was a “land grab” (Milana 
interview, 16 April 2009) that would cause “chaos” if Madhvani succeeds 
(Makamiko Claudia interview, 16 April 2009). 
The World Bank agrees with my Acholi interview participants; a July 2008 
report recommended a moratorium on land titles to investors in Northern Uganda 
until residents returned home from camps and people had been “sensitized” to 
land issues. The report also recommended that the government demonstrate its 
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commitment to protecting natural resource rights. Considering that the World 
Bank is one of the major promoters of land privatization globally, this is 
remarkable support for Acholi farmers. (Atkinson 2008).  
 
The Expansion of Gulu University  
 
 The federal government’s plan to expand Gulu University, a public 
institution opened in 2002, is another important instance of proposed 
governmental land expropriation. In a move that generated significant 
controversy, the government’s allocated 742 hectares of land to the university for 
expansion without consulting the approximately 10,000 people who would be 
displaced. Most of the land is communal (thus not legally titled), leading to 
widespread fear that the government will not compensate landowners (Laroo 
Division councilman Abonga Moses interview, 24 April 2009).  
 A Gulu University professor explained to me that locals “shouldn’t be 
against [the expansion], because the university will benefit them.  [The university 
and the Madhvani Sugar Plantation] are not the same institutions. This one is not 
income generating” (Odur interview, 24 April 2009). He also argued that as a 
public institution, the university has a negative association with the Museveni 
government (Odur interview, 24 April 2009). 
 Approximately 30 local landowners organized themselves into the Gulu 
Concerned Landowners Association in 2003 to oppose the proposed land 
takeover; the Association’s constitution states that it formed because residents 
were “facing the threat of unlawful eviction and other injustices pertaining the 
land” (Gulu Concerned Landowners Association statement, 2003). While the six 
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executive members of the Association acknowledged the importance of the 
university, they argued that the proposed area of take over was too large, 
landowners would not be compensated, and the displaced would have nowhere to 
live37. The Association also claims that locals feel disregarded by investors and 
university administrators, who “think they are superior [and] we are small,” as 
one executive member told me (Gulu Concerned Landowners Association 
interview, 24 April 2009). 
 The Association argues that they will not acquiesce to government 
takeover of communal land, stating that “we will fight to defend our land. This is 
our grandfather’s land” (Gulu Concerned Landowners Association interview, 24 
April 2009). They claim that if the plan goes forward, they “will fight [to] defend 
our land;” “if the police fail to control us,” one member continued, “it shall end 
up in war.” Ultimately, the Association claims, “they want to displace us as if we 
have no children. We need development; this is democracy” (Gulu Concerned 
Landowners Association interview, 24 April 2009).  
 As of 2009, the Association had mounted a vigorous legal battle against 
the Gulu University plan, successfully suing the public institution in two different 
court cases. Represented by Ocen & Co. Advocates, Obwoya Robert and Others 
versus Gulu University in case (No. HCT-02-CV-0019-2995) and Nicolas Ochora 
and 34 Others (in case No. HCT-02-CV-0025-2004) successfully sued Gulu 
                                                 
37
 Local Council Three Chairman Abonga Moses suggested that the displaced could move to rural 
areas (Abonga interview, 24 April 2009). The Association members contend, however, that 
rural locales are in the midst of their own land conflicts, the majority of which are land 
wrangles, and that it would result in violence should they move to those areas (Gulu 
Concerned Landowners Association interview, 24 April 2009). And Abonga Moses contended 
that there is very little infrastructure such as schools or health clinics in rural areas and there 
are no plans to create new centers for health or education; moving to rural areas would leave 
residents even more deprived of government services (Abonga interview, 24 April 2009).  
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University, resulting in a court injunction against the university’s expansion plan 
on October 31, 2006. Despite the court injunction, however, the plan moved 
forward. On July 31, 2007, however, the Gulu District Land Board appropriated 
land to the university against the court injunction, causing confusion regarding the 
future of the expansion. On June 14, 2008, the university sent a letter to residents 
stating that land surveyors would arrive to evaluate the monetary worth of the 
property so the landowners could be compensated when the university expanded 
into their land On June 18, 2008, Anywar Paolo, the founder and Chairman of the 
Association, sent a letter of reply stating that as per the court injunction of 2006, 
land surveyors would be interpreted as illegal criminal trespassers. Regardless, 
surveyors came to Laroo, but local youth chased them away (Gulu Concerned 
Landowners Association interview, 24 April 2009).  
 In April 2009, the Association forwarded their case to President Museveni 
via the presidential advisor to Northern Uganda. The members of the Association 
were certain that Museveni will protect their land and interests. An executive 
member of the Association told me that “he is going to answer that. We are a very 
big population. He has to help us. Our argument is leaning on the Constitution of 
Uganda which says the land belongs to the people, not the government” (Gulu 
Concerned Landowners Association interview, 24 April 2009)38. 
 
Mexico: The 1992 Agrarian Law  
 
 In 1989, President Carlos Salinas launched the “Reform of the 
Countryside,” a series of agrarian and economic “reforms” that ended decades of 
                                                 
38
 This presents an interesting paradox between reliance on Museveni to stop the expansion plan 
yet simultaneous hatred of him because of the war.  
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state-sponsored land redistribution established by Article 27 of the 1917 
Constitution. These policies came in the wake of the 1982 Mexican debt crisis and 
the subsequent cessation of the important-substitution-industrialization 
development model in Mexico; during this period, Salinas’s presidential 
predecessor, Miguel de la Madrid (1982-88) economically oriented Mexico 
towards deregulation, privatization, and economic liberalization (Pastor and Wise 
1997)39.  
 Salinas’s institution of wide-scale change in the Mexican agrarian system 
“intended to open Mexican agriculture to international markets and decrease state 
regulation of the agricultural sector” (Lewis 2000: 405)40. Mexico’s 1986 entry 
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) began the process of 
neoliberalization, an economic policy reinforced in 1990 “when tariffs on most 
products were dropped or drastically lowered, subsidies on inputs (including 
credit) were withdrawn or sharply reduced, and the guarantee price was 
eliminated for all crops but maize and beans” (Foley 1995: 62). Whereas the 
government previously subsidized (or provided for free) fertilizer, the electricity 
and water industries, machinery, and technical support to ejidatarios, those 
                                                 
39 De la Madrid's attempted to stabilize the national economy and solve the national debt problem 
through a neoliberal plan of “reduc[ing]...government spending and [enacting] a large on-time 
devaluation of the peso. Unfortunately, the recessionary impact of this initial strategy was more 
severe than originally anticipated, and much of the task of economic adjustment was left to” 
Salinas (Pastor and Wise 1997: 331).  
40 Salinas decided to “stabilise the macroeconomy by combining: (1) an incomes policy (i.e. wage 
and price guidelines), which was codified in a series of tripartite pacts including government, 
business, and labour; (2) fiscal restraint, which removed the underlying inflationary impetus; 
and (3) a commitment to a stable peso with the further liberalisation of imports, the rationale 
being that import competition would serve as an additional brake on inflation” (Pastor and 
Wise 1997: 332). In the short term, this lowered inflation and jumpstarted economic growth. 
Halfway through Salinas reign, however, returns diminished. Policy makers were hesitant to 
change the liberalization policies as they felt pressure from both national and international 
parties and Salinas team had already entered NAFTA negotiations (Pastor and Wise 1997: 
332).   
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services were privatized in the early 1990s. This increased price inputs for small-
scale farmers and challenged economic survival.  
 Further augmenting economic difficulties for small farmers, Anagsa, the 
government’s crop insurance program, was eliminated and Mexico’s rural 
development bank Banrural gave loans only to “peasant growers whose 
operations were judged profitable” (Foley 1995: 62)41. The simultaneous decline 
in credit availability from national development banks intensified the negative 
economic impact on ejiditarios and “the total amount of credit in pesos received 
by the ejido sector decreased by 20 per cent between 1990 and 1994” (Lewis 
2000: 405). These changes angered both peasants and commercial growers, as 
foreign competition increased and production input costs soared. Peasant farmers 
had little economic recourse as foreign agricultural markets flooded both the 
international market with cheaper products. Imports into Mexico swelled, leaving 
growers with bad debt and dependent on crop insurance (Foley 1995).  
It was in this context42 that on November 7, 1991 President Salinas 
announced the 1992 Agrarian Law43, profoundly altering agrarian use throughout 
                                                 
41 To replace previous government subsidies for agriculture, the government implemented a 15-
year direct income support program called PROCAMPO, which “have benefited the 
approximately 2.5 million subsistence farmers in Mexico by providing rural aid based on land 
farmed as opposed to amount of grain produced for sale” (Lewis 2002: 410).  
42 Salinas’ 1989 agrarian changes should also be analyzed retrospectively in the context of 
policies in the 1940s and 1950s, “the period of the rapid expansion of large-scale irrigated 
agriculture once knows as the 'Mexican miracle'” (Foley 1995: 60). Policies at that time gave 
landholders increased protections in the judicial system and  legal limits on individual land 
parcels were disregarded. Electricity, pesticides, water, and fertilizer subsidies were available 
for farmers with credit. This made peasant farmers more economically vulnerable, as they had 
to work through middlemen to sell products and “subsidized inputs promoted high productivity 
on modernized farms, leaving undercapitalized peasant producers ever farther behind. 
...Limited access to land and growing populations promoted minifundismo and drove millions 
of peasants to emigration or agricultural labor on unfavorable terms” (Foley 1995: 62).  
43 The 1992 Water Law should also be analyzed in conjunction with the 1992 Agrarian Law. The 
Water Law “transferred the management of irrigation districts from the government to its users. 
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Mexico. The changes to the law were “conceived behind closed doors under the 
president’s direction and quickly imposed with a minimum of consultation” 
(Foley 1995: 67).  Governmental rhetoric surrounding the change of the seven-
decade policy framed the changes in terms of the “modernization”44 and increased 
efficiency of the ejido, “considered by its critics to be one of the main obstacles to 
agricultural growth. The insecurity of collective tenure, the relatively small size of 
individual plots and the underinvestment held to characterize the ejido sector were 
viewed as barriers to economic efficiency and progress” (Lewis 2000: 406)45. 
This was “probably the most thoroughgoing and radical revision of agrarian 
relations since Cardenas” in its economic and legal scope (Foley 1995: 62). Foley 
(1995) argues that the neoliberal reforms of Mexico differ little from...the 
‘progressive’ enclosing landlords of 18th century England, despite the century-
long gaps between them” (64), a replication quite similar to land tenure changes 
in Uganda.  
The constitutional changes legalized ejidatarios right to right to “rent, sell 
                                                                                                                                     
Hitherto farmers had received water at substantially subsidized prices, paying approximately 
85 per cent of total water costs in the early 1960s and approximately 15 per cent by the late 
1980s. These subsidies were significantly reduced with the new water law, and government 
transfers to support on-farm irrigation decreased from US$102 million in 1992 to US $36 
million in 1995” (Lewis 2002: 413). Many farmers connect high prices for water and irrigation 
as a primary reason for renting out their ejido (Lewis 2002).  
44  Opposition to inalienable landholding can be traced to the 1857 Mexican Ley Lerdo, “whose 
creators saw in the inalienable landholdings of church and peasant community a fundamental 
obstacle to the modernization of Mexican agriculture and the Mexican economy” (Foley 1995: 
64).  
45  Conservative arguments state that the change in Article 27 was not privatization per se 
because “the ejido has never been public land and thus the reform is not equivalent to 
privatization…if the ejido had ever been public, expropriation would have been unnecessary 
(Jones and Ward 1998: 79). According to this argument, the reform has left the decision of 
whether or not to privatize in the hands of individual ejidatarios (Jones and Ward 1998: 79). 
Considering the significant increase in economic difficulties in maintaining small-scale 
farming because of the neoliberalization of the Mexican economy, however, framing 
privatization in terms of “choice” is highly euphemistic.  
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or mortgage their previously inalienable land; created programmes and 
institutions to officially certify and record ejidatarios’ rights to their land; and 
allowed for that formation of joint ventures between ejidos and the private 
sector,” including foreign investors (Lewis 2000: 403). Additionally, the new 
article constitutionally disallowed groups of peasants from petitioning for ejido 
land, as reform proponents argued that there was no land left to distribute. Further, 
the new law allowed commercial associations, private investors, and stock 
companies to purchase ejido land, though these groups cannot hold more land 
than the “legal limit for individuals multiplied by the number of members, and the 
total for any one association cannot exceed 25 times the individual limit. Groups 
of investors, moreover, cannot incorporate anonymously—individual investors 
must be registered publicly and cannot, via investment, acquire more than the 
legal limit of small property” (Foley 1995: 65). The government also gave 
landowners two years to sell excess land before it was seized by the state. These 
changes were intended to increase foreign investment in formally communally 
accessed land (Lewis 2000).  
 Critical to the legal alienation of ejido land, the 1992 law made the 
dissolution of communal ejido property possible with a majority vote that would 
distribute the land amongst its members. Additionally, any ejidatario or group of 
ejidatarios are now permitted to partner with joint-stock companies, associations, 
or individuals for the use of ejido land, thus widening the possibility of privatized 
use of formerly communal land. It also allows for legal rental of ejido land and 
states that land can be offered as loan collateral; defaults on those loans, however, 
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lead to at least temporary loss of access to land, and “without the crop insurance 
system of the past defaults have become common, particularly in marginal areas” 
(Foley 1995: 66). Whereas the former article required that ejidatarios personally 
cultivate their parcel to maintain their land rights, the new law abolishes that 
provision. Further, the new Agrarian Law created the Program for the 
Certification of Ejido Land Rights and the Titling of Urban House Plots 
(PROCEDE) to officially certify ejidatario rights to their land.  
 In response to the new law, the peasant movement was split into two broad 
groups: the New Peasant Movement and the Coordinadora de Organizaciones 
Agrarias (CAP) who, respectively, accepted and rejected the proposed 
constitutional changes. The CAP and its constituent organizations drafted a 
dissenting response to the proposed law, but this initiative was ignored by the 
Mexican legislature. “The constitutional reform was passed in January and the 
implementing laws, after a mere two weeks of debate in extraordinary session of 
the legislature, in mid-February” (Foley 1995: 67).  
 The changes in Mexican agrarian policies paved the way for Mexico’s 
signing of NAFTA, a regional trade agreement between Mexico, the U.S., and 
Canada. This neoliberal measure came six-years after the 1988 passage of the 
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. NAFTA’s goal was to eliminate 
trade barriers between the three countries by eliminating tariffs on more than half 
of US imports from Mexico and more than one third of US exports to Mexico. 
The stated goal at the time was to eliminate all tariffs between Mexico and the US 
in ten years, except for some US agricultural exports to Mexico that would be 
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eliminated in 15 years.  
 Despite claims that NAFTA would improve the Mexican economies, the 
depreciation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 resulted in a 50 percent rise 
in inflation in 1995, as well as the quick rise in nominal interest rates. From 1989-
94, the Mexican interest rate averaged 27 percent in nominal terms and 8 percent 
in real terms and soared to 61 percent and 19 percent in nominal and real terms by 
1995 (Lewis 2000). Under NAFTA, the U.S. government subsidizes U.S. farmers’ 
crops (most notably corn), while Mexican farmers are not granted the same 
governmental support; U.S-produced corn thus floods the international market at 
falsely low prices, dramatically challenging the ability for Mexican farmers to 
economically survive. The increased usage of genetically modified crops also 
hinders Mexican farmers as new seeds must be purchased each growing cycle 
rather than non-altered seeds that can be reused. The disastrous effects of NAFTA 
on Mexican peasant farmers has been well documented46, though it is not the 
purpose of this project to chronicle the free trade treaty. In the next chapter, I 
more specifically explore the effects of the 1992 Agrarian Law whose impact 
must also be examined with the neoliberal influence of NAFTA on Mexico.  
The combination of these increasingly neoliberal programs dealt a 
devastating blow to the ejiditarios who “had long benefitted from government aid 
in the form of input subsidies, crop guarantee prices, and additional credit and 
housing programmes” (Lewis 2000, 405). While the 1992 amendment was 
                                                 
46 For more information about the negative effects of neoliberal trade policies (and NAFTA in 
particular), see Deglobalization by Walden Bello (2005), A Brief History of Neoliberalism by 
David Harvey (2005), and Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order by Noam 
Chomsky (2003).   
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predicted by many to “result in the mass sale of ejido land, increase land 
concentration, and heighten poverty in ejido communities” (Lewis 2000, 403), the 
actual ramifications of the change depend largely on “a combination of factors, 
including type of land and access to it, agricultural management practices, 
proximity to the USA, ethnic composition of ejido population, and history of 
agricultural practice and agrarian reform in the region” (Lewis 2000, 403). Some 
studies show that economic privatization has been increased, resulting in 
increased alienation from the land (Lewis 2000). The withdrawal of government 
support for ejidos resulted in an increase in ejidatarios renting out their land due 
to a lack of “capital to compete in a highly mechanized agricultural environment 
that favours land consolidation and large farm sizes” (Lewis 2000, 408).  
Farming became decreasingly financially viable due to high input prices 
(including water, machinery, and genetically modified seeds that must be 
repurchased each growing season) and challenges competing with the falsely low 
prices of U.S. agricultural products (particularly corn) in the international market. 
Simultaneously, “Article 27 no longer requires ejidatarios to work their land 
personally in order to maintain ownership rights” (Lewis 2002, 416); these 
challenging economic factors lead to high rates of emigration. Lewis (2002) 
argues that as increasing numbers of young ejido members emigrate to urban 
centers in Mexico and internationally, the value of ejido land as family patrimony 
will decrease” (Lewis 2002, 416).  
Tight immigration regulations made it nearly impossible, however, to 
emigrate legally, so many turned towards undocumented border crossing. This 
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coincided with the 1994 “Operation Gatekeeper,” which constructed walls 
through border cities and increased the number of Border Patrol Agents. Thus, as 
economic depravity forced a need for migration, Operation Gatekeeper 
simultaneously increased the number of deaths of border crossers as walls force 
immigrants through the dangerous Sonoran Desert.  
Increased environmental degradation was also prevalent as a direct result 
of NAFTA. Because “NAFTA allows companies to sue governments for cash 
compensation if a country implements legislation that ‘expropriates’ the 
company’s future profits” (Shiva 2002: 96), corporations have successfully sued 
the Mexican government when it attempted to stop corporate environmental 
damage. For instance, the U.S. American waste management company Metalclad 
won $17 million in a lawsuit against the Mexican government after its waste 
disposal and treatment sites in San Luis Potosi were closed “by local officials on 
the grounds that it was not environmentally sound. … The intense community 
opposition to Metalclad’s facility was irrelevant” (Shiva 2002: 96).  
Immediate resistance to these policies came from peasant farmers, 
including many women. In 1995, the “Women’s Platform for the Dialogue” at a 
Zapatista conference in Chiapas had the following demands in 1995: “throw out 
the new Article 27 because it takes away women’s right to land;” “women should 
have the right to own and inherit landed property;” “if a man abandons his family, 
the parcel should automatically pass to the woman;” “in recognition of women’s 
property rights and to protect the children, land adjudication and titles should 
explicitly include women as co-owners” (Deere and Leone 2001: 153).  This came 
 85 
in response to widespread agreement that the constitutional changes to Article 27 
particularly negatively effected women by a) deeming that ejidos could be 
dissolve only by ejido members, only 17.5 percent of whom are women; b) 
allowing the dissolution of individual ejidos to give his family the “right of first 
buyer,” though because many rural women have low wages many are unable to 
buy the land should their partner choose to dissolve his parcel; c) changing 
inheritance law so ejidos no longer remain within the family, plac[ing] rural 
women in a much more prearious position than ever before with respect to land 
rights;” and d) no longer requiring a parcel of ejido land to be used for women’s 
productive activities  (Deere and Leone 2001: 151-152)47.  
  
 
Concluding Comparative Discussion 
 
In Minnesota, Uganda, and Mexico, the end of physical violence did not 
bring lasting peace or land security to the Dakota, Acholi, or indigenous Mexican 
populations. Conversely, the legal changes to land access enacted by all three 
state governments exacerbated experiences of physical violence in these 
communities. In all three cases, national legislation legalized land alienation and 
severely hindered farmers’ ability to access their land, which led to varying levels 
of homelessness, starvation, emigration, and death. As such, legalized land 
alienation constituted a form of structural violence, with land policies “built into 
the structure” leading to “unequal power and consequently…unequal life 
                                                 
47
 Women's resistance to the agrarian changes was coupled by the campaigns of the Ejercito 
Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN, or the Zapatistas), a revolutionary political group 
that officially declared war against the Mexican state on January 1, 1994, the day that NAFTA 
came into effect in Mexico. The EZLN, based out of Chiapas and formed primarily by Mayan 
farmers, has continued to oppose neoliberalism in Mexico. 
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chances” (Galtung 1969: 170). While federal policies were implemented nation-
wide, their negative effects disproportionately affected people with non-capitalist 
land tenure systems who already experienced physical violence. 
In Minnesota, U.S. policy effectively eradicated all of the Dakota’s 
communal land and pushed the Dakota people who had not been killed into 
reservations; fraudulent treaties played a critical role in the complete alienation 
and expropriation of Dakota land. According to my Acholi informants, the 
Museveni government’s contemporary policies will, if implemented, exacerbate 
preexisting malnutrition, homelessness, and breakdown of community-based 
cultural systems caused by the war; the piecemeal privatization of communal 
Acholi land has already led to a decrease in subsistence farming, the most 
essential component of Acholi life. In Mexico, the 1992 constitutional change in 
agrarian law has led to the continued breakdown in communally accessed ejido 
property. Indigenous communities that relied on communal farming for survival 
disproportionately experience the resulting poverty, which has resulted in wide 
scale migratory out-fluxes, environmental degradation, and reported losses in a 
sense of community.  
Following intense periods of physical violence targeting the Dakota, 
Acholi, and indigenous Mexican communities, this structural violence enhanced 
preexisting somatic and psychological violences. As such, physical and structural 
violences mutually reinforce each other in these cases. Although the specificities 
of the legislation vary greatly, all of the described policies took advantage of 
previous periods of violence to legalize the expropriation of exploitable land that 
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began during the physical violence stage. In this context, these legislative policies 
reaffirmed the belief of the populations that physical violence was as an excuse 
for land take over, intimately linking the underlying cause of war to the legislative 
changes that followed.  
Although physical violence catalyzed the process of Marxian primitive 
accumulation, legislation attempted complete the land privatization necessary for 
imposing capitalism on formerly non-capitalist populations. Additionally, this 
structural violence made returning to “normalcy” after physical violence nearly 
impossible because the basis for rebuilding the fundamentals of life—physically 
self-sustaining oneself and ones family—was eroded.  
 In the next chapter, I outline the combined effects of physical and 
structural violences, which I argue leads to the third stage resulting from the 
process of land alienation: intra-community violence.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
INTRA-COMMUNITY VIOLENCE AND RESISTANCE 
 
 Solina, an elderly Acholi woman, spends hours every day digging cassava 
and millet in her garden in the Laroo Division of Gulu District in Northern 
Uganda. Originally from the village of Unyama, about ten kilometers away from 
Laroo, Solina moved to Gulu Town during the war to escape from extreme 
physical violence in her village. During her time in Gulu Town, Solina often fell 
sick, complaining of frequent bouts of malaria. Now living in the more rural area 
of Laroo, Solina’s health restored through access to a garden, digging, and open 
space. But despite the marked improvements in her life in the post armed conflict 
era, Solina has not yet returned to her communal land in Unyama; disputes with 
neighbors there regarding her communal land have created potentially severe 
physical insecurity despite the cessation of armed conflict in 2007. 
  Even after physical violence and changes in land policy, violence does not 
abate. In Chapter 4, I discuss the effects of land alienation formed by the physical 
and structural violences highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3. I focus on the political, 
economic, and cultural effects of the forced commodification of formerly 
communal land, which leads to the third stage of violence: intra-community 
violence.  
  In the wake of physical and structural violences, intra-community violence 
has devastated the Dakota, Acholi, and indigenous Mexican populations and 
reinforced the severe negative effects of land alienation. This frequently comes in 
the form of violent land wrangles and legal disputes between neighbors over the 
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exact demarcation of land. With much of the community knowledge of land 
delineation destroyed by war, community members often begin to fight each other 
for the ownership of now-privatized land. Corporate and outsider control of 
Dakota, Acholi, and indigenous Mexicans’ land (as well as other natural resources 
such as water and oil) further exacerbate intra-community conflict as land 
becomes a quickly diminishing resource and thus access to it becomes 
increasingly urgent. Intra-community violence in some cases threatens to augment 
into full-scale war, thus restarting the process of the three stages of violence this 
project analyzes. This violence also decreases the possibility of re-accessing 
communal land as community divisions allow for outsider land expropriation and 
privatization.   
Theoretical Background of Intra-Community Violence  
 
 The long-term effects of physical and structural violence, as well as the 
effects of capitalist resource expropriation, have been a site of theoretical analysis 
for the scholars who inform my project. Shiva argues that the “destruction of 
resource rights and erosion of democratic control of natural resources....[reduces] 
culture...to a negative shell where one identity is in competition with the ‘other’ 
over scarce resources that define economic and political power” (2002: Xii). 
While communal control is not necessarily synonymous with democratic control, 
Shiva’s contention highlights “the double fascism of globalization” which enables 
this violent competition, as survival depends on responses to “economic fascism 
that destroys people’s rights to resources and...fundamentalist fascism that feeds 
on people’s displacement, dispossession, economic insecurities, and fears” (Xii). 
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Pitted against each other by globalization in order to control scarce natural 
resources in their communities, my case study populations (to different extents) 
have experienced intra-community competition and violence after “economic 
fascism” largely disrupted community rights to resources via legal changes.   
 Similarly, Galtung and Farmer contend that structural violence results in, 
and is necessitated by, material violence. Galtung argues that there is a possibility 
“that manifest structural violence presupposes latent personal violence. When the 
structure is threatened, those who benefit from structural violence, above all those 
who are the top, will try to preserve the status quo so well geared to protect their 
interests” (1969: 179). Writing specifically about post-armed conflict periods, 
Galtung expects “a focus on personal violence...lest they should become between-
war periods; and if the periods protracts sufficiently for the major outburst of 
personal violence to be partly forgotten, we would expect a concentration on 
structural violence” (174). This highlights that the “post” of armed conflict is a 
euphemistic term; war may officially cease (or not, in the case of Northern 
Uganda, where the government and LRA have yet to sign a peace agreement), but 
both physical and structural violence continue. 
  Farmer (2004a) argues that the adverse material consequences of structural 
violence include “epidemic disease, violations of human rights, and genocide” as 
well as “death, injury, illness, subjugation, stigmatization, and even psychological 
terror” (308). While he highlights the role of the those in power to enact material 
violence (specifically citing the U.S. prison systems, Haitian death squads, and 
police brutality in Bombay, India), I argue that given continued resource scarcity 
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also results in violence internal to the community. The material and psychological 
consequences of structural and physical violence, coupled with uneven political 
and economic power distributions within communities, create situations of 
continued Galtungian violence48.  
Case Studies: Intra-Community Violence in the Dakota, Acholi,  
and Indigenous Mexican Communities 
The Dakota: Legal Battles and Leadership Tensions 
 
 The long-term effect of war, land privatization, and forced assimilation has 
been devastating to Dakota communities, although important community efforts 
work against this destruction. The Indian Land Tenure Foundation argues that 
“although the end result was probably not anticipated, the intended change to 
Indian lifestyle brought about by the Allotment Act has caused widespread social, 
cultural, and economic hardships for Indian people” (The Message Runner 2002: 
2).   
 Different forms of internal governance heavily divide Dakota communities 
in North and South Dakota and Nebraska. In one faction, some Dakota 
communities govern themselves under the constitutions created by the IRA. In 
another, the practice of the tioyapaye is still vibrant yet not represented by the 
IRA-formed governments. This causes tension and great divides internal to 
communities as a continuing legacy of colonial “divide and conquer” policies. 
Direct actions, such as building occupations, violently mark these intra-
community tensions based on differing governance styles. 
                                                 
48 I refer to Galtung's definition of violence as “when human beings are being influenced so that 
their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (1969: 
168).  
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The 1973 Wounded Knee takeover is another example of intra-community 
violence. After many American Indians had been killed by whites with impunity 
by both the U.S. government and the IRA governments, the American Indian 
Movement (AIM) and the Oglala Lakota of the Pine Ridge reservation occupied a 
church located at the site of the Wounded Knee massacre. This highly symbolic 
action brought out U.S. martials and IRA forces that resulted in a violent three-
month standoff. The Wounded Knee takeover deeply divided the Pine Ridge 
reservation and deepened mistrust between the IRA governments and the 
traditional tioyapaye but was not successful in ending the plenary powers of the 
U.S. government as AIM had desired.  
The Pine Ridge reservation, now home to the Oglala Lakota, in South 
Dakota on the border of Nebraska provides an additional example of intra-
community violence, though in this instance one of the communities is formed of 
white U.S. Americans who inhabit Whiteclay, Nebraska. Whiteclay is less than 
two miles from Pine Ridge and sells alcohol approximately 12,500 cans of beer a 
day to Pine Ridge inhabitants. “Sale and possession of alcoholic beverages on the 
Pine Ridge is prohibited under tribal law. Except for a brief experiment with on-
reservation liquor sales in the early 1970s, this prohibition has been in effect since 
the reservation lands were created” (“The Battle for Whiteclay”). Whiteclay 
alcohol sales are made without regulation and in frequent violation of Nebraska 
law; despite requests by Pine Ridge for regulation of Whiteclay alcohol sales 
which promote widespread alcohol addiction and that disease’s accompanying 
violences, the State of Nebraska has done nothing to regulate Whiteclay sales.  
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Work is being done to combat the community violence in Pine Ridge. 
Terry Janis of the Indian Land Tenure Foundation argues that the increasing 
practices of spiritual ceremonies and sweat lodges allows for more social 
interaction between younger people from families who represent the IRA and 
tioyapaye governments; social bonding by these young people has helped to heal 
intra-community wounds (interview, 10 March 2010). 
 In Minnesota, meanwhile, divisions in the Dakota community exist as a 
legacy of the differing roles played during the U.S. Dakota war and genocide. 
Two different communities, the Shakopee and Prairie Island, are descendents of 
the Dakota “loyal” to the U.S. government during that violence; today, the 
Shakopee and Prairie Island communities operate casinos in Minnesota which 
garners $1 million a year for each member of the communities. Dakota 
communities that formed the Dakota Diaspora as a result of the 1862 internment 
and physical violence cannot access this gaming wealth. Sheldon Wolfchild, the 
president of the Lower Sioux and a descendent of the diasporic Mdewakanton 
Dakota, sued the U.S. government in a class action lawsuit (representing 2,000 
members of the Mdwekanton community) over this conflict of unequal access. 
According to Wolfchild, the law suit is “a legal effort to unite all three 
communities under one government where all share in the profits of Jackpot 
Junction, Treasure Island and Mystic Lake casinos,” which are currently operated 
only by the Shakopee and Prairie Island communities (Schechter 2006). The 
lawsuit argues that because of the war and genocide, the U.S. government is to 
blame for its failure "to protect the rights of the descendants of the loyal 
 94 
Mdewakanton" (Schecter 2006). The suit has created great controversy and 
divisions between different Dakota communities as a direct outcome of the 
violence that took place 150 years ago (Schechter 2006).  
 There are active movements to support the regaining of American Indian 
homelands throughout the U.S., including within the Dakota communities. These 
movements can be divided into initiatives by Indian nations and by non-
governmental and non-profit organizations. Of the initiatives made by Indian 
nations, many are inter-tribal efforts that have formed organizations such as the 
National Association of the Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, the Tribal 
Education Department National Assembly, the National Congress of American 
Indians, the Great Plains Tribal Chairman’s Association, the Affiliation of Large 
Land-based Tribes, and many others. These diverse groups work to advocate for 
Indian rights and the preservation of land, among other goals.  
Additionally, many non-profits work for land recuperation. One example 
of an organization working towards recuperation is the Indian Land Tenure 
Foundation (ITLF), which founded in 2001 and based in Little Canada, 
Minnesota. The ITLF actively works to “support the acquisition, ownership and 
management of Indian land by tribes and Indian people” (ITLF CD-ROM). The 
ITLF was formed after a three-year planning process that involved hundreds of 
American Indian people from throughout the U.S. with the collective goal that 
“land within the original boundaries of every reservation and other areas of high 
significance where tribes retain aboriginal interest are in Indian ownership and 
management” (The Message Runner 2000: 1). The ITLF articulates its mission in 
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part as a means of rectifying the “wrong perpetrated on Indian people by the 
General Allotment Act [which] have continued unabated for the past 115 years” 
(The Message Runner 2000: 1). It works towards this goal through programming 
and grants in education, law reform, cultural revitalization, and economic 
development. In the education area, ITLF works to create and implement a school 
curriculum about American Indian land rights that stresses the critical relationship 
between people and land; the ITLF also gives grants to educators to implement 
this curriculum. Additionally, the ITLF supports the legal efforts of American 
Indians to acquire their land.  
Another American Indian non-profit organization, the Indian Land 
Working Group (ILWG) works with individual Indian landowners.  ILWG “meets 
annually to discuss ways to make the fractionate lands useful again. Indians are 
encouraged to consolidate their family’s ownership interests through a variety of 
methods including purchase, exchange, or gift deeds when they can” (The 
Message Runner 2002: 3). 
 Movements towards language recuperation also strive to restore 
community unity and heal the divides formed by colonial invasion. Through 
language schools (such as the first Dakota language immersion preschool and 
family language classes)49, the creation of a Dakota-English dictionary and 
computer programs, and more informal family-based language learning, Dakota 
communities actively work towards the restoration of the linguistics that are so 
critical to identity.  
  
                                                 
49
 These programs were in place until April 2000 (Wilson 2005: 112).  
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The Acholi: Land Wrangling  
 
 War and land privatization have ravaged Northern Uganda, resulting in a 
sharp increase in land conflict between the Acholi people as safe access to 
communal land decreases. In September/October 2008, the Gulu District NGO 
Forum (an organization that serves as a hub for the dozens of local and 
international non-governmental organizations operating in Northern Uganda) 
carried out a study about perceptions of key land issues in Gulu and Amuru 
districts. Among the 35 land conflicts that informants identified, the most pressing 
included: limited knowledge on the processes of acquiring certificates and 
renewal of titles by the community; misinterpretation of the land laws by some 
organizations; sub county boundary conflicts; legality of some land owners given 
land during Idi Amin’s regime; reclamation of communally owned land by 
individuals; land grabbing from the disadvantaged people (orphans, widows); 
encroachment on public land; the dilemma of land owners who hosted IDPs; 
reclaiming formerly given land by ancestors to friends, relatives, in-laws, and 
institutions by the current generation; and land wrangles (Gulu District NGO 
Forum, 2008). In the post-armed conflict era in Northern Uganda, conflicts 
surrounding land have become a key deterrent in creating sustainable peace in the 
region.  
 As previously discussed, the twin policies of the central government and 
the LRA resulted in widespread disease in camps, food dependency and loss of 
culture of digging, difficulty of access to land because of physical insecurity 
(because of the presence of one or both of the armed forces as well as land 
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mines), and destruction of property. As such, “war and displacement have limited 
or even deprived most Acholi from growing their own food” (Finnstrom 2008: 
35). Large-scale land privatization policies threaten to augment pre-existing land 
alienation; despite the temporary stalling of those policies, it is increasingly 
common for individuals to sell their plots of communal land piece-meal, 
quickening the process of privatization.   
 But the violence of land expropriation does not stop there. In an example 
of Shiva’s argument that when denied sovereignty over natural resource control, 
internal conflicts occur to access scarce resource, local land conflicts in Northern 
Uganda now pose intra-community threats to safe land access. These land 
wrangles occur as neighbors, families, and clans dispute, sometimes violently, 
over land boundaries and ownership. Land wrangles most often stem from a lack 
of knowledge of the specific boundaries of communal land; knowledge about the 
demarcations of communal land was generally not written down, but rather held 
by elders, many of whom died during the war. The UPDF’s policies of 
deforestation further exacerbated this problem, as trees that formerly delineated 
land boundaries no longer stand. Many youth, who have spent the majority of 
their lives in camps, have returned back to their ancestral villages to claim 
familial property, only to find others claiming the same plot. As privatized land 
titles become more common, confusion and manipulation concerning the sale of 
land results in further conflict. Local government has been largely ineffective in 
outlining land plots and peacefully settling land disputes, frequently leading to 
violence as people fight to defend the little land they have left after decades of 
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violence.   
 One example of a local land wrangle was recounted to me by Otim 
William. He told me:  
 
There is a land dispute between us and somebody who came early. So they 
came here and they stay here for about 29 to 30 years. The acres that 
they’ve been plowing—they expanded the  boundaries on our land. With 
the dispute, we take it to the LC, but they’ve failed to solve. We  talked 
to the paramount chief so there could be peace (interview, 19 April 2009).  
 
In another example, Solina related her experience with land wrangles on 
her communal land in Unyama. She says the land “was destroyed but not by the 
LRA but by the people, the neighbors. One lady took my land, but she gave it 
back. I spoke with my mouth and said everybody should bring back my land. If 
you want to dig, you should come ask me then I can help them. It is in accordance 
with the law” (Solina interview, 16 April 2009). Because not all the land was 
given back, problems continue on her land.  
 Solina recounted another episode of investors causing internal family 
strife, this time in the case of a neighbor:  
 
Some white men collided and bought land without consent of the other 
family members. The  family sat down with the brother [that sold the land] 
and told him to take the money back to the white man. How could he sell 
cultural land? They got their land back, but some of money had already 
been spent (interview, 16 April 2009). 
 
 Abonga Moses, the Local Council (LC) Three of the Laroo Division, 
estimates that about 90 percent of the cases heard by the Division Court 
Committee concern land issues, the majority of which are for land wrangles 
(Abonga interview, 24 April 2009). Many of these conflicts stem from confusion 
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caused by selling a single plot of land to multiple buyers, selling land at a low 
price and then reselling the same land to another person at a higher price and then 
returning the original buyers’ money, and unclear delineation of land borders 
(Abonga interview, 24 April 2009). In order to solve these local land cases, 
citizens go to the LC Two Chairman and then, if one party decides to appeal the 
case, to the Division Court Committee; it is ultimately the Gulu District Land 
Board that holds the power to decide land issues in Gulu (Abonga interview, 24 
April 2009).  
 Contemporary land struggles have been particularly disenfranchising to 
women, as they cannot directly inherit land through the patrilineal Acholi land 
system; this leads to disproportionately high rates of land loss by women. 
Unsupportive local governments seem unwilling and unable to help women regain 
access to the land. Women also continue to face physical insecurity while 
farming, particularly from former LRA and UPDF soldiers. The lack of 
infrastructure and support for digging, such as equipment, tillable land, and 
manual labor, also affects women’s ability to return to farming (Obunya interview, 
10 February 2009).  
Despite this, many people have not lost hope and strongly believe that 
despite current struggles, Acholis will never lose access to their land. Stella told 
me that “land is always there. Even you in your place have land. It’s God given” 
(interview, 21 April 2009). Recognizing that increasing safe access to land could 
provide the security needed to return to peace and normalcy, there have been 
movements by local government and Acholi cultural leaders to create a nonviolent 
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mechanism for demarcating the borders of their land plots and hold local 
government accountable for peacefully settling land disputes.  
 To do so, local cultural and governmental figures drafted a proposal to 
create an Acholi Communal Land Trust. The Trust would serve as an umbrella 
organization for overseeing and implementing an ambitious communal land-
mapping project, as well as form an important bridge between local government 
and cultural leaders (Atkinson 2008). The proposed Land Mapping Project would 
have helped protect land rights and decreased the instances of land wrangles by 
delineating borders without titling them as privatized land. The project would 
conduct a needs assessment in consultation with local communities, aided by 
many different leaders and experts. Clan leaders would draw clan boundaries to 
come to a consensus regarding the delineation of clan land. These agreed upon 
boundaries would be digitized and printed in hard copy; this would provide the 
necessary proof to developers and investors that this land was not “free” or “idle” 
but protected by an agreement with the local government and cultural leaders, 
thereby enabling greater land security. It was proposed that the Land Mapping 
Project could also lead to the creation of Customary Land Associations and 
certificates of customary ownership, providing even more security against 
developers and land wrangles. Unfortunately, these plans stalled and there are no 
longer plans to continue forward with the implementation of the Land Mapping 
Project (Atkinson 2008). The attempt, however, is an important reference for 
future plans to help Acholis protect their land.  
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Indigenous Communities in Southern Mexico: Piecemeal Dissolution   
 
 As of 2002, there were still more than 27,000 ejidos and 3.1 million 
ejidatarios in Mexico, accounting for more than half of Mexico’s arable land 
(Lewis 2000: 404). Despite this, however, intra-ejido conflict and factionalism 
have become increasingly common in the wake of changes in Article 27. Legal 
provisions of the constitutional amendment disallow former constitutional 
provisions that allowed for groups of peasants to petition for land undermined 
“the basis for a great deal of peasant mobilization and organization” (Foley 1995: 
65).  
Increasing poverty, inequality, and inability to self-sustain within ejido 
communities augments the problem of community strife, which has been 
experienced throughout Mexico. While proponents of neoliberalism claimed that 
neoliberal policies under the Salinas administration would create economic 
growth, this has largely not been felt on a micro-level. Resultingly, some 
ejidatarios sell their parcel of ejido land, leading to their piecemeal dissolution. 
 Because of differentiated land uses within ejidos and the legal ability for 
individuals to sell land that used to be accessed by the collective, intra-community 
strife arises.  
For example, in the Yaqui Valley in northern Mexico, ejidatarios “stated 
feelings of community within their ejido had decreased since 1992. Explanations 
given included lack of interest in ejido matters by fellows ejidatarios; poor 
attendance at ejido meetings; poor administration and/or corruption by ejido 
leaders; the ‘individualization’ or ‘sectorization’ of the ejido; and the increased 
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rate of land rentals” (Lewis 2002: 413). As land rentals increased, so did negative 
opinions about community. “As feelings of unity decreased among ejidatarios, 
individual members have had fewer qualms about renting their land to persons 
outside of the ejido nucleus” (Lewis 2002: 413).   
There is also a generational component of ejido use changes. There are 
higher rates of ejido rental by the “children and grandchildren of ejidatarios” 
because they “are not as historically tied to their land” (Lewis 2002: 414).  Lewis 
(2002) argues that “ejidatarios who inherit from their relatives are farther removed 
from direct struggles waged to gain land, and for this reason are often more 
willing to transfer control of its management” (Lewis 2002, 414).  
There are, however, widespread movements to recuperate communal land 
and control agricultural production. For instance, the Coordinadora Nacional de 
Ayala (CNPA) formed in the 1980s “to gain control of the productive process and, 
through it, economic power at the grass roots” (Foley 1995: 60). Under the slogan 
“land to the tiller,” during the 1990s the CNPA demanded “adequate crop prices, 
credit, the renegotiation of old debts, and the maintenance of subsidies on inputs; 
among the activities are credit unions, commercialization schemes, fertilizer 
distribution enterprises, first-stage processing plants, and rural stores” (Foley 
1995: 60). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Union Nacional de 
Organizaciones Regionales Campesinas, a network of autonomous regional and 
local organizations, was a primary organization to help peasants recuperate 
alienated land (Foley 1995: 61).  
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Concluding Comparative Discussion 
 
 Although the combined effects of physical and structural violences caused 
by land alienation devastated the case study populations, perhaps the most 
enduring and dangerous result is the accompanying intra-community violence that 
occurred as individuals struggle to access quickly dwindling natural resources. As 
accessing land becomes increasingly difficult, vying for the resource pits 
individuals against each other, furthering the breakdown of community-based 
economic, political, and cultural systems.   
 In Minnesota, Dakota communities are currently engaged in legal battles 
to access wealth garnered through the gaming industry while intra-community 
struggles regarding governance style also persist. This violence directly results 
from Euro-American “divide and conquer” policies during the stages of physical 
and structural violences. In Northern Uganda, the increasing frequency of land 
wrangles between neighbors threatens to spark a new civil war. In Mexico, the 
piecemeal selling and renting of ejido land erodes the collective basis of the ejido 
system.  
Understood in a vacuum, intra-community violence is often portrayed as 
an example of uncivilized, barbaric people turning against each other. Because of 
this (in addition to tearing apart communities, reducing the ability to safely access 
land, and augmenting the preexisting loss of cultural, political, and economic 
systems), intra-community violence can serve to justify the original rhetorical 
logic of state-sponsored physical violence: the state’s political, economic, and 
cultural interventions are necessary to turn “inadequately” capitalist populations 
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into capitalist subjects. Intra-community violence could be used as an excuse for 
increased outsider intervention into community sovereignty.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
CONCLUSION 
 
“Land is not equal to money.  
Money will just be scattered around, but land will always stay.” 
 
-Solina, interview participant 
 
 My research explores the forcible incorporation of non-capitalist land use 
mechanisms into the capitalist market system. I argue that a mutually reinforcing 
combination of physical violence (war and militarization), structural violence 
(legislated land alienation), and intra-community violence (land wrangles and 
legal debates) result in a forcible shift from communal land use practices to 
privatized systems, which ultimately devastates the practices of communities that 
previously relied on communal land. I use the case studies of the Dakota in 
Minnesota, the Acholi in Northern Uganda, and indigenous communities in 
southern Mexico to demonstrate the relationship between land privatization and 
the three stages of violence.  
This project chronicles how the three stages of violence—all created by 
land privatization—reinforce each other. Physical violence “cleared” communal 
land of its inhabitants and legislative changes reinforced this process, provoking 
intra-community strife. The juridical and physical battles of intra-community 
violence in some cases threaten to trigger more physical violence, aiding the state 
and corporate goal of accessing land for exploitation. Separated from the 
ownership and use of communal land, members of my case study populations 
became employed wage laborers for the profit of outside parties.  
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 The theoretical implications of my findings extend beyond Minnesota, 
Uganda, and Mexico. I argue that my claims that the institutionalization of 
capitalism depends upon multiple forms of violences may also apply to other 
communities and to resources other than land. Ultimately, I argue that not only 
does capitalism depend upon violence, it can be a form of violence in and of 
itself.  
 In this chapter, I reiterate and expand on my analytic and theoretical 
claims to show how my work contributes to existing academic literature. I further 
develop my argument that capitalism is a form of violence and discuss the larger 
implications of this claim. I close by suggesting areas for further research and my 
hopes for the future of this project.  
 
Analytic Claims  
 
 This project argues that the state and its corporate partners alienated all 
three case study populations from their land. In Chapter 2, I argued that the 
process of land alienation and expropriation begins via physical violence; as war 
and internment force inhabitants from their homes, their land is left idle and thus 
“open” for expropriation by investors, settlers, or the state. I also demonstrated 
that in all three case studies, the states’ desire to acquire communal land in order 
to privatize it was a key impetus of the physical violence. The Dakota War and 
subsequent genocide in Minnesota, the two-decade war in Northern Uganda, and 
the militarization of southern Mexico by combined army and police forces created 
the violence that left formerly communal land available for privatization. As such, 
land privatization was both the goal and outcome of physical violence.  
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 In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that following periods of physical violence, 
the state implemented legislative changes that legally alienated communities from 
their land via a privatized land system. Although these pieces of legislation were 
implemented nation-wide, their negative effects were disproportionately felt by 
communities who previously did not operate under a market-based land system. I 
argued that land alienation exacerbated the negative effects of war and the 
inability to safely access communal land resulted in Galtungian structural 
violence. Unable to safely access their land because of disenfranchisement, the 
Acholi, Dakota, and indigenous Mexicans experienced high rates of poverty, 
malnutrition, homelessness, and even death. This structural violence completed 
the process of primitive accumulation and strengthened the capitalist land system. 
The U.S. 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux and the 1887 Allotment Act, the 2007 
Ugandan Land Bill (as well as two other privatization schemes exclusive to 
Northern Uganda), and the 1992 Mexican Agrarian Law constitute prime 
examples of legalized land alienation through national legislation.  
 In Chapter 4, I discussed the overall effects of physical and structural 
violences and introduced intra-community violence, the third stage in this process. 
Conflicts between neighbors regarding land delineations destroyed by war and 
eroded by privatization now threaten communities and, in some cases, create an 
atmosphere ripe a new civil war. These intra-community conflicts also distract 
from the continuing encroachment of the state and corporations who rely on 
violence to enact the capitalism necessary for natural resource exploitation.  
 Although the three stages of violence roughly correspond to the process of 
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land alienation (beginning with a war, followed by legal changes and then intra-
community strife), the case study populations demonstrate marked differences and 
are not neatly aligned. While the Dakota and Acholi experienced the stages of 
violence in a temporally linear manner, the case of Mexico varied. In Mexico, the 
1910 Revolution enacted state-sponsored land redistribution that aimed to break 
down the latifundio system in place since Spanish colonialism; though the ejido 
system—the collective landholding system established under Article 27 of the 
1917 Constitution—was not entirely successful, it is differs from the state 
(neo)colonial policies in Uganda and Minnesota that alienated the Acholi and 
Dakota from their collective land tenure. Unlike in Minnesota and Uganda, whose 
period of legislative changes occurred in the wake of war, legal land changes in 
Mexico occurred simultaneous to the militarization of southern Mexico, where 
state troops targeted indigenous communities that resisted neoliberalism, 
particularly in the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero. And unlike the cases 
of the Acholi and Dakota, who were specifically targeted by the Ugandan and 
Minnesotan armies, the Mexican troops did not focus on a singular ethnic group, 
but rather any indigenous community that opposed neoliberalization. 
 Despite these differences, there are striking similarities of the effects of 
land privatization and changes in land tenure in the cases of the Dakota, Acholi, 
and indigenous Mexican case studies. In all three cases, land privatization not 
only threatened economic well-being but physical well-being as well as those who 
present a challenge to the commodification of land become embroiled in the 
state’s violence. 
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Theoretical Implications  
 
War, governmental policies, and community strife are normatively 
understood as separate entities, as if existing in a vacuum outside of larger 
political, economic, and social forces. I complicate this understanding by arguing 
that physical, structural, and intra-community violences neither begin nor end 
with themselves, but are stages in a larger process. In the case of communities 
with non-capitalist land tenure systems, the state, corporations, and other 
beneficiaries of capitalism frequently orchestrate these stages of violence in order 
to alienate people from their communal land. As such, none of the stages should 
be understood as separate occurrences, but rather a collective process to force 
land privatization.  
 In an era of increasing neoliberalism and corporate power, the implications 
of the violence inherent to capitalist privatization appear devastating. Enacting a 
privatized land tenure system is a way of naturalizing capitalism by trying to 
destroy resistance, which comes from communities whose self-sustenance system 
runs counter to privatization. As a result of this, I argue that capitalism is a form 
of violence. My research demonstrates that capitalism cannot be implemented 
without a high degree of physical, structural, and intra-community violences, 
which alone are not enough to shift communal land systems to privatize one.  
My argument bridges several different theories and expands upon existing 
notions of natural resource use, capitalism, and violence. I demonstrate that the 
cases of the Dakota, Acholi, and indigenous Mexicans are examples of primitive 
accumulation; the enclosure of the commons and transforms rural peoples into 
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wage laborers on their now-alienated land. I argue that this process of primitive 
accumulation (achieved through physical and structural violence) is a form of 
structural violence as the inability to access land results in the unequal life 
chances and death described by Galtung (1969) and furthered analyzed by Farmer 
(2001; 2004a; 2004b). The effects of land privatization are no less severe than the 
consequences of colloquial understandings of physical violence. 
In arguing that land privatization is a form of structural violence, I 
reinforce neo-Marxist theorists’ claims that neoliberal exploitation of natural 
resources is a “double fascism” (Shiva 2002: Xii). Hegemonic neoliberalism 
presents natural resource privatization as a natural activity that is an inevitable 
stage in the linear progress narrative of so-called modernity. My project, however, 
argues that the incorporation of non-capitalist peoples into capitalism is inherently 
a violent process that needs the three stages of violence to be fully enacted. What 
is presented as “natural” actually rests on genocidal grounds and can only be 
implemented through violence.  
 
Conclusion 
  
Paul Farmer (2004a) argues that the “erasure or distortion of history is part 
of the process of desocialization necessary for the emergence of hegemonic 
accounts of what happened and why” (308). Throughout this project, I have tried 
to complicate normative understandings of the implementation of land 
privatization and its connection to other sociopolitical and economic events in 
order to work against the hegemonic histories that Farmer describes.   
I hope that reading this project provides readers with a more critical lens 
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of global conflict’s connections to resource use. Often, violence is misrepresented 
and misunderstood as barbarity acting outside of the political economy. In an 
example of this assertion, Mahmood Mamdani (2009) argues that what has been 
labeled a “genocide” in Darfur, Sudan is actually not the Black versus Arab 
conflict that the Western media portrays, but rather a complicated conflict over 
natural resource use. Another example of distorted portrayals of violence that are 
in reality inextricably connected to natural resource use is the case of so-called 
Somali “pirates.” Beginning in 1991, European ships began dumping nuclear 
waste on the shores of this coastal nation, resulting in radiation sickness. 
European over-fishing of Somalia’s ocean has devastated Somali fisherman who 
have lost their livelihoods. In this context, “pirates” attack European ships and 
Western media portrays them as nothing more than barbaric thugs (Hari 2009). I 
aim to heighten awareness of the vital role of resource use and access in global 
conflict and the role privatization plays in different forms of violence throughout 
the world.  
Given the constraints on this work in terms of time-span, geographic scope 
and lack of primary source material in two of my cases, my project has not yet not 
exhausted its possibilities in terms of analytic and theoretical connections. In 
particular, I have not addressed the changing relationship between corporations, 
the state, and global financial institutions in our age of deregulation, “free” trade, 
and environmental devastation due to overuse and misuse of natural resources. I 
am left with lingering questions: how does climate change (and the resulting 
challenges in producing enough food in many agricultural communities) 
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complicate the relationship between land privatization and violence? How does 
the relationship between corporations and the state differ across my case studies 
and in countries that I did not directly examine? How do differing states’ political 
systems affect the implementation of land privatization? How does the study of 
privatization and violence translate into urban environments, where communities 
throughout the world attempt to access resources such as water, electricity, and 
other utilities?  
 With these questions left unexamined, I hope to continue active 
conversations about the violent role capitalism plays in quotidian and larger-scale 
events. Increasing resistance to neoliberalism and natural resource privatization 
throughout the world has sparked global conversations between activists who seek 
to challenge capitalism’s hegemony and provide more sustainable, peaceful, and 
local alternatives to exploitation. I hope that this project is part of that 
conversation.  
 Safe land access can act as the cornerstone to sustainable and self-
determining peace. And communities throughout the world, including the three 
case studies I chronicle, attempt to reclaim their land rights to build upon 
community economic, political, cultural, religious, and social systems threatened 
by land privatization. But this is also a reclamation of autonomy, of history, and of 
community; reestablishing access to communal directly threatens the capitalism 
presented as the natural progression of modernity. As such, attempts to practice 
non-capitalist land tenure systems not only provide vital sustenance but also 
destabilize the hegemony of capitalism so necessary for breaking its cycles of 
 113 
violence. I believe that exploitation of community natural resource rights is the 
primary basis for the most pressing political, economic, environmental, social, 
and cultural crises of our time. Restoration of and respect for those sovereign 
rights is critical.  
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